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Abstract 
Empirical studies on information communication technologies (ICT) typically aggregate the ‘information’ and 
‘communication’  components  together.  We  show  theoretically  and  empirically  that  this  is  problematic. 
Information and communication technologies have very different effects on the decisions taken at each level of 
an organization. Better information access pushes decisions down by allowing employees lower in the hierarchy 
to make decisions more effectively. Better communication pushes decisions up by allowing employees to pass 
decisions up to the top of the hierarchy more easily. Using an original dataset of firms from the US and seven 
European countries we study the impact of ICT on worker autonomy, plant manager autonomy and span of 
control.  Consistently  with  the  theory  we  find  that  better  information  technologies  (Enterprise  Resource 
Planning, ERP, for plant managers and CAD/CAM for production workers) are associated with more autonomy 
and a wider span of control. By contrast, communication technologies (like data networks) decrease autonomy 
for both workers and plant managers. Treating technology as endogenous using instrumental variables (distance 
from  the  birthplace  of  ERP  and  heterogeneous  telecommunication  costs  arising  from  different  regulatory 
regimes) strengthen our results. 
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ISBN 978-0-85328-380-5 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Most studies of the impact of information and communication technologies (ICT) on ﬁrm
organization, inequality and productivity (see below) treat ICT as an aggregate homogeneous
capital stock. However, these technologies have two distinct components. First, through the
spread of cheap storage and processing of data, information stored in databases is becoming
cheaper to access (IT). Second, through the spread of cheap wired and wireless communications
(CT), agents ﬁnd it easier to communicate with each other (e.g. e-mail and mobile devices).
Reductions in the cost of accessing information stored in databases and of communicating
information among agents can be expected to have a very diﬀerent impact on ﬁrm organization.
While cheaper communication technology facilitates specialization, generating a reduction in
the variety of tasks performed by workers as agents rely more on others, cheaper information
access has an ‘empowering’ eﬀect, allowing agents to handle more of the problems they face
without relying on others. This diﬀerence matters not just for ﬁrms’ organization, but also for
productivity and in the labor market.1 In this paper, we utilize a new international ﬁrm-level
data set with directly measured indicators of organization and technologies to study whether
indeed ICTs have these distinct eﬀects.
Our starting point is the analysis in Garicano (2000) on the hierarchical organization of
expertise. Decisions involve solving problems and thus acquiring the relevant knowledge for
the decision. In determining at what hierarchical level decisions should be made, ﬁrms face
at r a d e - o ﬀ between information acquisition costs and communication costs. Making decisions
at lower levels implies increasing the cognitive burden of agents at those levels. For example,
decentralizing from the corporate head quarters (CHQ) to plant managers over the decision
whether to invest in new equipment requires training plant managers to better understand
ﬁnancial decision making, cash ﬂows, etc. To the extent that acquiring this knowledge is
expensive, the knowledge of the plant manager can be substituted for by the knowledge of
those at corporate head quarters. Relying more on the direction of corporate head quarters
reduces the cognitive burden on the plant manager and so lowers the total information acqui-
sition costs. But this comes at the price of increasing communication between levels in the
hierarchy, increasing total communication costs. From a cognitive perspective, decentralized
1Information access and communication technology changes can be expected to aﬀect the wage distribution
in opposite directions. For example, Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) analyze theoretically this impact on
wages.
2decision making thus implies an increase in the cost of information acquisition to economize
on communication costs: trading-oﬀ knowing versus asking for directions.
The level at which decisions are taken thus responds to the cost of acquiring and com-
municating information. Reductions in the cost of communication allows for a reduction in
knowledge acquisition costs through the increasing use of ‘management by exception’, e.g. lo-
cal managers rely more on corporate managers for decision making. Reductions in the cost of
information access, on the other hand, reduce the cognitive burden imposed by decentralized
decision making and makes more decentralization eﬃcient. Consequently, information and
communication technologies aﬀect diﬀerently the hierarchical level at which diﬀerent decisions
are taken. Improvements in information technology should push decisions ‘down’ leading to
decentralization while improvements in communication technology should push decisions ‘up’
leading to centralization.
In this paper, we study this cognitive view of hierarchy by testing for the diﬀerential impact
on the organization of ﬁrms of these two types of technologies (information vs. communication).
To do this, we extend Garicano (2000) to consider two types of decisions and discuss in each
case technologies that make it easier for agents to acquire the information necessary to make
them and their technologies that improve communication. This extension is methodologically
important as the data available to researchers on real authority has multiple types of decisions
(e.g. worker decisions on the production line vs. managerial decisions on investment). First,
we consider non-production decisions. These decisions can either be taken at the corporate
head quarters by corporate oﬃcers, or delegated to a business unit (in our case, the plant
manager). The speciﬁc decisions that we study are capital investment, hiring new employees,
new product introductions and sales and marketing decisions. The key piece of information
technology that has recently aﬀected information access by these managers is, as we discuss in
Section 3, Enterprise Resource Planning (). These  systems increase dramatically
the availability of information to decision makers in the company, that is they reduce the cost
of acquiring information to solve a problem.2 It follows that they should increase the autonomy
of the plant manager.
Second, we consider factory ﬂoor production decisions. These are decisions on the produc-
tion process that can either be taken by production workers or by those in the plant hierarchy,
such as which tasks to undertake and how to pace them. Here, a key technological change in the
manufacturing sectors we focus on is the introduction of Computer Assisted Design/Computer
2We present survey evidence consistent with our discussions with technology experts that  primarily re-
duces information acquisition costs rather than reducing communication costs (see sub-section 4.3 and Appendix
B).
3Assisted Manufacturing (). A worker with access to those machines can solve prob-
lems better, and thus needs less access to his superiors in making decisions. This technology
should increase their autonomy and, by reducing the amount of help they need from plant
managers, increase the span of control of plant managers.
In sum, we expect ‘information technologies’ ( and ) to decentralize de-
cision making respectively in non production decisions (from CHQ to plant managers) and in
production decisions (from plant managers towards production workers). On the other hand,
as we argued above, we expect communication technologies to centralize decision making. This
will be true both for production workers (so that plant-managers will take more of their deci-
sions), and also for plant-managers (so that the corporate head quarters will take more of their
decisions). A key technological innovation aﬀecting communication is the growth of networks.
We thus also test whether the availability of networks reduced the decision making autonomy
in production decisions of workers, and in non-production decisions of managers.
We utilize a new data set that combines plant-level measures of organization and ICT
across the US and Europe. The organizational questions were collected as part of our own
management survey work (see Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007) and were asked to be directly
applicable to the theories we investigate. The technology dataset is from a private sector
data source (Harte-Hanks) that has been used mainly to measure hardware utilization in large
publicly listed ﬁrms (e.g. Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2002), whereas we focus on the
less used software components of the survey.
In terms of identiﬁcation, we mainly focus on conditional correlations between the diﬀerent
ICT measures and three dimensions of the organization of the ﬁrm, guided by our theoretical
predictions. But we also consider two instrumental variable strategies. First, we use the
distance from Walldorf which was the German birthplace of the  company and remains
the location of its headquarters as an instrument for  presence.  was the ﬁrst major
 vendor and is still the market leader. This draws on the general observation, which is true
in our data, that the diﬀusion of an innovation has a strong geographical dimension.3 Second,
we utilize the fact that the diﬀerential regulation of the telecommunication industry across
countries generates exogenous diﬀerences in the eﬀective prices of networks. We show that
industries that exogenously rely more on networks are at a greater disadvantage in countries
with high communication costs, and use this to identify the eﬀect of communication costs on
3Examples of how geographical proximity is important for diﬀusion include Henderson, Jaﬀea n dT r a j t e n b e r g
(2003), Skinner and Staiger (2005), Griﬃth, Lee and Van Reenen (2007), Holmes (2010) and (for a survey) Foster
and Rosenzweig (2010). Becker and Woessmann (2009) use distance from Wittenberg as in instrument for the
spread of Protestantism in Germany which they show fosters human capital. Note that in our regressions we
control for human capital, so this cannot be driving the results.
4decentralization. Our IV results support a causal interpretation of the eﬀect of information
and communication technologies on ﬁrm organization.
In short, the evidence is supportive of the theory. Technologies that lead to falling informa-
tion costs for non-production decisions (like ) tend to empower plant managers (relative
to the CHQ) and technologies that lead to falling information costs for production decisions
(like ) tend to empower workers relative to plant managers. Information technolo-
gies also widen the span of control. By contrast, technologies that reduce communication costs
(like networks) lead to more centralization and have ambiguous eﬀects on the span of control
(in the theory and the data).
Much previous empirical work on has tended to aggregate ICTs together as one homoge-
nous technology due to data constraints, often simply measured by computers per person or
“ICT capital”. As noted above, this is problematic since hardware will simultaneously reduce
information and communication costs, and we show that these should have very diﬀerent eﬀects
on ﬁrm organization. One strand of the literature also looks for complementarities between
ICT and organizational aspects of the ﬁrm, but takes organization as exogenous.4 As e c o n d
branch tries to endogenize organization, but does not discriminate between types of ICT.5 A
third branch, which we are perhaps closest to, looks more closely at the eﬀects of ICT on or-
ganization but does so in the context of a single industry in a single country.6 What is unique
about our study is the disaggregation of types of ICT and organization across a number of
industries and countries.
An alternative to our cognitive perspective is that hierarchies may be a solution to incentive
problems (e.g. Calvo and Weillisz, 1978; Aghion and Tirole, 1997; Dessein, 2002), linked to
automation (Autor et al, 2003) or the result of coordination issues (Cremer et al. 2007 and
Alonso et al, 2008). Although we do not reject the potential importance of other mechanisms,
we think our information perspective is ﬁrst order and provide some empirical support for this
in a range of robustness tests.7
We proceed as follows. In Section 2 we discuss a basic theoretical framework that allows us
to study the impact of information and communication technologies. We then map the model
4Examples include Black and Lynch (2001), Bresnahan, Brynjolsson and Hitt (2002), Bartel, Ichinowski and
Shaw (2007) and Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2011). See also the survey in Draca, Sadun and Van Reenen
(2007).
5For example see Acemoglu et al (2007), Caroli and Van Reenen (2001), Colombo and Delmastro (2004),
Crepon et al (2004) and Aubert et al (2004). To explain the evidence for trend delayering described in Rajan
and Wulf (2006), Guadalupe and Wulf (2008) emphasis competition rather than ICT.
6See, for example, Baker and Hubbard (2003, 2004) or the case studies in Blanchard (2004).
7Our work also relates to the wider theoretical literature on ﬁrm delegation. For example, see Baron and
Besanko (1992), Melumad et al (1995), Mookherjee (2006), Baker et al (1999), Radner (1993) and Hart and
Moore (2005).
5to the data by identifying some key factors that aﬀected information and communication costs
(Section 3). We then discuss our data (Section 4), and present our results (Section 5). The
ﬁnal section oﬀers some concluding comments.
2T h e o r y
2.1 Communication technology Centralizes; Information Technology Decen-
tralizes
Garicano (2000) proposes a theory of a hierarchy as a cognitive device. In the model the role
of hierarchy is to facilitate the acquisition of knowledge by increasing its utilization rate. Here
we present a simpliﬁed version of that theory, which allows us to extend it towards a setting
with diﬀerent types of decisions (production and non-production).
Assumption 1. Production requires time and knowledge. Each production worker draws a
unit measure of problems (or tasks or decisions) in [01] per unit of time. Production only
takes place if all the problems are dealt with by someone in the organization. We normalize to
1 the output per agent and per unit of time once problems are solved. Some problems occur
more often than others: problems are distributed according to a density function () Agents
c a no n l yd e a lw i t hap r o b l e mo rt a s ki f they have the relevant knowledge.
Assumption 2. Knowledge acquisition is costly. T h ec o s ti n c u r r e db ya na g e n t to acquire
the knowledge necessary to deal with problems in [0] is proportional to the length of the
interval of problems,  The parameter  which is individual speciﬁc, may depend on the
technology available to diﬀerent agents and their skill. Thus an agent who acquires the in-
formation required to perform all the tasks in [01] incurs a cost  and produces net output
1 − 8
Assumption 3. Knowledge can be communicated. Managers can be used to provide di-
rections and thus economize on the knowledge that must be acquired by production workers.
Speciﬁcally, the cost of training agents can be reduced through a hierarchy in which production
agents’ only deal with a fraction of problems - that is, those in (0 )- and ask for help on the
rest to an agent  (for manager) who is specialized in problem solving. A communication or
helping cost  is incurred whenever help is sought, that is  is incurred per question posed.
Clearly, communication is minimized if workers learn the most common problems and ask help
8The cost of information acquisition was denoted “” in earlier versions of this paper to be consistent with
Garicano (2000). The change in notation here was made to avoid confusion with communication, or helping,
cost “”.We assume the cost of learning is linear so that learning  problems costs  This is without loss, as
we can redeﬁne problems of tasks so that () is the frequency of a renormalized (equal cost) problem.
6on the rest; thus without loss of generality, we reorder problems so that 0()  0 i.e. more
common problems have a lower index and are performed by workers. In other words, ‘manage-
ment by exception’ is optimal, so that workers do routine tasks and managers deal with the
exceptions.9 Figure 1 illustrates this task allocation.
[Figure 1 about here]
The value of problem solvers or managers is that by reducing lower level workers’ decision
range, the cost of acquiring information is reduced. The cost of hierarchy is the time wasted
in communication, since problem solvers do not produce output, but instead use their time to
help others solve their problems.
Suppose a team must deal with  problems per unit of time. The team needs then 
production workers in layer 0 and  managers or problem solvers. The proﬁts generated
by this hierarchy with  production workers, each receiving a wage ,a n d managers
s p e c i a l i z e di n‘ p r o b l e ms o l v i n g ’ or ‘helping’, receiving a wage ,i s : 10
 =  − ( + ) − ( + ) (1)
that is, when the  production workers deal with problems in [0 ] they must learn the 
most common problems. We further assume (although it is unnecessary for the results) that
the learning technology is such that managers know all the tasks that workers also know, and
more, so that knowledge overlaps.11 Thus since all tasks must be dealt with  =1 .A
production agent can deal with a fraction () of the tasks and asks for help with probability
(1−()) Thus a manager spends time (1 −()) helping each production worker. Since
there are  agents, the needed number of managers or problem solvers is (1−()) = 
resulting in a span, or ratio of workers per manager of  = . This constraint determines
at r a d e - o ﬀ between what the agents below can do and how many managers are needed. The
9See Garicano (2000) for a formal proof. In that paper, there are potentially many layers of problem solvers,
and organizations can decide which problems to do and which ones not to deal with at all- while here all
problems must be solved. It is shown that the organization set up in the model (characterized by ‘management
by exception’) is optimal. Intuitively, if those lower in the hierarchy learnt exceptions (rather than routine
tasks), the tasks could be swapped, reducing communication costs. Here, in our basic model, there are only two
layers and all problems are (eventually) solved; the only choice is who learns the solution. The model with two
types of problems in Section 3.2. extends the framework in Garicano (2000).
10We are solving throughout for the partial equilibrium eﬀe c t s( t a k i n gw a g e sa sg i v e n )a si sc o m m o ni nt h e
literature (see e.g. Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). For a general equilibrium analysis with heterogeneous workers
(i.e. where wages are adjusting) see Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006).
11This overlapping knowledge assumption is used because it seems more reasonable in the empirical context,
but it is irrelevant for the comparative statics in the propositions here, as can be seen by replacing (1 −
())( + ) by (1 − ())((1 − )+) Overlapping knoweldge could result from learning that
takes place on the job or because the process of learning involves learning the ‘easy’ tasks ﬁrst.
7more knowledge acquired by lower level agents, the less managers are needed. Figure 2 provides
an overview of the model.
The problem of the hierarchy is to decide the size or span of the hierarchy () and the
degree of worker autonomy () so as to maximize proﬁts per problem. Substituting for  in
equation (1) we obtain:
∗ =m a x

[ (1 − ( + ) − (1 − ())( + ))]
[Figure 2 about here]
The following comparative statics follow immediately.
Proposition 1 Communication Centralizes; Information Access Decentralizes
1. A drop in communication (or ‘helping’) costs () reduces worker autonomy () and has
an ambiguous impact on span of control  =  (more questions are asked, but each
one takes less time).
2. A reduction in the cost of acquiring information of all agents ( =  = ),o ro n e
aﬀecting only lower level agents, , increases lower level autonomy () and increases
managerial span of control,  (as less questions are asked).
The formal proof of the above is straightforward. Note ﬁrst that 0()  0 implies that the
second order conditions for optimization is met, 22
  0. Then the ﬁrst result follows from
t h ef a c tt h a t 2
  0 . Second, letting  =  =  we have that at the optimum (using the
ﬁrst order conditions): 2
  0. Similarly 2
  0 i.e. if workers can learn cheaper they
do more. The changes in span follow straightforwardly from  =  =1 ((1 − ()))
The intuition for these results is as follows. (1) Higher communication cost raises the
value of additional worker knowledge, since that economizes on communication. (2) Higher
information acquisition costs for all agents raise the value of asking questions for workers,
economizing on expensive information acquisition. Essentially, while communication cost re-
ductions facilitate the reliance of specialist problem solvers and decrease what each worker can
do, reductions in the cost of acquiring information make learning cheaper and reduce the need
to rely on specialized problem solvers for help with solutions.
82.2 Extension: Production and Non Production Decisions
Middle managers perform two broadly diﬀerent functions. First, they are at the top of the
production hierarchies, dealing with the problems that production workers could not handle,
as outlined in the model above. Second, they also are at the bottom of a non-production
hierarchy, potentially dealing with managerial decisions on things like hiring/ﬁring, investment,
product introduction and marketing delegated to them by corporate head quarters. To study
the implications of the multiple roles played by middle managers, we extend the model in the
simplest possible way considering a multilayer hierarchy involving corporate managers, middle
managers (in our data, plant managers) and production workers.
In this extension, corporate head quarters and middle-managers deal with non-production
(management) decisions, , while middle-managers and production workers deal with produc-
tion decisions, 
Production Decisions: As above, each production worker confronts one production decision
per unit of time,  ∈ [01]. He can deal with a measure  of these production decisions. That
is, for those   he asks a middle manager for help. Decisions are distributed according
to cdf () with pdf () As previously, optimality (management by exception) implies
0()  0 so that production workers specialize in the more common tasks. A cost  is
incurred each time the middle manager must be involved in production. Production workers
can acquire knowledge at cost  and middle managers at cost  A ﬁrm that must deal with
 production problems requires, as previously, (1 − ()) =  middle managers.
Non-Production Decisions: The existence of a hierarchy generates non-production decisions.
In particular, each middle manager generates a measure 1 of non-production decisions per unit
of time, where non-production decisions  ∈ [01] are drawn from a density function (),
again with 0()  0 implied by optimality. If the middle manager has the knowledge to deal
with these decisions, he does so instantaneously. If he does not, he passes on the problem to
corporate head quarters. Similarly to production workers, middle managers acquire knowledge
so that they can take a fraction  of those decisions (they can solve those problems). Thus
if the problem drawn is   a middle manager solves it; if not, the corporate manager
intervenes. A helping cost  is incurred as before when top managers have to intervene, that is
helping each middle manager costs (1 − ()) units of corporate manager’s time.12 For an
agent  to learn to take (all) of the non-production problems costs  a cost dependent on the
12We assume communication or helping cost  is the same for production and non-production decisions for
simplicity since in our empirical application we cannot distinguish diﬀerent communication costs. Conceivably,
some technologies may aﬀect communication costs diﬀerently for production and non-production, and that
would have to be taken into account in the formulation.
9technology available to manager ; thus training middle managers to deal with non production
problems costs  while, analogously to the production decision case, corporate managers
can deal with all (a unit measure) of non-production problems at a cost  ( for corporate),
with  ≷ .A h i e r a r c h y w i t h  non-production problems where middle managers have
knowledge  requires (1 − ()) =  corporate managers.
Thus the proﬁts of a hierarchy with production workers, middle managers and corporate
managers are given by:
∗ =m a x

 − ( + ) − ( +  + ) − ( + ) (2)
The ﬁrst term are the  units of output produced by  production workers. The second
term is the costs of employing production workers - their wage () and the costs of providing
them with enough information to deal with decisions   () The third term is the cost
of  middle managers - their wage (), and training them to deal with production problems
() a n dw i t haf r a c t i o n of non-production problems. The cost of dealing with production
and non-production problems is assumed to be the same, since a given technology is available
to each manager to deal with these problems.13 The last term is the cost of  corporate
managers - their wage () a n dt r a i n i n gt h e mt od e a lw i t ham e a s u r eo f1 non-production
problems () The organization must choose the set of decisions dealt with by workers and
middle managers,  and  (as illustrated graphically in Figure 3) as well as the number of
middle managers and corporate managers, subject to the time constraints of middle managers
and corporate managers.
[Figure 3 about here]
Replacing the number of middle managers  and of corporate managers  required to
manage  production workers, the proﬁts per production worker can be written (dividing








Which allows us to generalize in a straightforward manner the results above.
13This assumption can be weakened by assuming them diﬀerent, with the only cost being the extra notation.
10Proposition 2 1. A reduction in communications costs () leads to a reduction in produc-
tion decision making by production workers () and in non-production decision making
of middle managers (), and has an ambiguous impact on spans of control.
2. A reduction in the cost of acquiring information of lower level agents () leads to an
increase in production workers autonomy () and in the span of control of middle man-
agers ( = )
3. A reduction in the cost of acquiring information either by middle managers () or
by them and corporate managers ( and ) increases autonomy of middle managers
in non-production decisions () and the span of corporate managers ( = );
it reduces the autonomy of production workers () and the span of control of middle
managers ()
We show these results formally in Appendix A.
In summary, the framework generates eight comparative static results for the direct impact
of the information cost and technology cost variables ( ) on the four organizational
outcomes (   ) shown in propositions 1 and 2. We report tests of six of these pre-
dictions for worker autonomy, plant manager autonomy and plant manager (  ) in the
main paper, as we have good measures of these organizational variables. We report results for
the remaining two predictions for CEO span () in the Appendix and sub-section 5.5 because
unlike plant manager span we do not measure CEO span directly. From the theory there are
also a further four “cross” predictions of the indirect eﬀects of technology on organizational
measures - such as the impact of production information costs on plant manager autonomy.
We also report tests of these more subtle eﬀects in the Appendix and in sub-section 5.4.
3 Changes in Information and Communication Technology
The key technological parameters in the model are those that aﬀect the cost of information
access and the cost of communication. In this section we discuss three advances in technology
that had substantial impact on information and communication costs. Concerning communica-
tion (or ‘helping’) costs, we focus on the introduction of intranets (). Concerning
information access costs, we focus on the widespread adoption of  technologies,
and the introduction of large, real time, connected databases, in the form most notably of
‘enterprise resource planning’ () systems. The reason we focus on these three technolo-
gies is that they are major advances in the manufacturing sector that we study, as well as
11other sectors like retail, wholesale and banking.14 We also believe they map clearly into reduc-
tions in communication costs () and reductions in information acquisition costs
in production () and management ().
3.1 The Rise of Intranets: Facilitating Communication through the Orga-
nization ()
A ﬁrst parameter that aﬀects the allocation of decisions in our model is communication costs.
An important shifter of these costs over last decade has been the introduction of corporate
intranets. These allow companies to connect manufacturing plants to corporate head quarters,
reducing the cost of communication between head quarters and local managers. In the past,
f o re x a m p l e ,s h a r i n gd o c u m e n t a t i o nw i t hh e a dq uarters required the use of fax or mail. These
high communication costs made speedy decisions from the head quarters extremely diﬃcult
and costly, leading to the delegation of day-to-day control of the plant to local management.
Once the leased-lines and corporate intranet are installed, the cost of communication between
local and central managers is reduced. This allows for the use of more experienced central
management to be swiftly alerted to signs of production problems - for example identifying
speciﬁc types of output variations as fault indicators - and able to provide swift decision
making support. Intranets also reduced the cost of communication inside the production plants,
facilitating the ﬂow of information between the shop ﬂoor and the plant manager. These
network technologies are equally important in retail, wholesale and retail banking. Other
general communication technologies include cell phones and e-mail.
Given the model, we expect the rise of intranets, which reduces communication cost, to
be a centralizing technology, as it allows for increasing specialization as ‘questions’ are more
cheaply posed to the experts.
3.2 Computer Assisted Design and Manufacturing (CAD/CAM): Increas-
ing Information Access at the Shop Floor ()
A second important parameter in our model is the change in the cost of access to information
on the production ﬂoor. A crucial recent change in these costs has been the introduction of
CAD/CAM.
New manufacturing orders generally require design, testing and redesign, typically by the
engineering department. The process traditionally started with the design being provided by
the supplier - for example an exhaust pipe for a new military vehicle - which the engineers
14This is based on reviewing the literature, US, UK, China and India factory visits and discussions with
engineers and consultants at Sun Microsystems, EDS, HP, McKinsey and Accenture.
12would mock-up and produce in a trial run. Once this was successful the engineers would go to
the manufacturing facility, e.g. the exhaust factory, to supervise a small scale production run,
and produce the ﬁrst prototypes. The local manager would oversee this process, working with
the engineers to ensure his plant could implement the designs in-house, or have these externally
procured. These initial production runs would then be shown to the customer, reﬁn e di na
further design iteration, and ﬁnally set-up for the full-scale production run by the engineers.
The introduction of  (computer aided design) allows the plant to directly design products,
and  (computer automated manufacturing) enables the production team to program up
the Computer Numerical Control equipment to produce the key parts.15
In this way,  has increased the amount of information available to the produc-
tion team and enabled them to carry out the initial prototype design and production stage,
reducing the involvement of both the plant manager and the remotely based corporate head
quarters engineering team. Similar technologies in retail and banking, like customer databases
and relationship management tools, have empowered store-level employees to cross-sell other
products like insurance and credit (e.g. Hunter et al, 2001).
Given the theory described above, we expect  to be a decentralizing technology:
since workers have access to more/better information, they can make more decisions themselves
without consulting their superiors.
3.3 Connected Real Time Data Bases: Increasing Managerial Information
Access ( )
The cost of access to information by local plant managers () and central, head quarters’
based managers () has been directly aﬀected by the installation in ﬁrms of Enterprise Re-
source Planning () systems. ERP is the generic name for software systems that integrate
several data sources and processes of an organization into a uniﬁed system. These applications
a r eu s e dt os t o r e ,r e t r i e v ea n ds h a r ei n f o r m a tion on any aspect of the production and sales
process in real time. This includes standard metrics like production, waste, deliveries, ma-
chine failures, orders and stocks, but also broader metrics on human resource and a range of
ﬁnancial variables. An  system is based on a common database and a modular software
design. The main sellers of  are SAP and Oracle, both used by more than half of large US
business. The introduction of  systems is typically the largest investment in information
technology in manufacturing related business: in 2006,  was estimated to represent just
15Traditionally these would be used to drive numerically controlled programming tools (see for example, the
description of their use in the valve industry in Bartel et al, 2007).
13under one third of all application IT spend in large US companies.16
To understand the impact of  consider again the example for an exhaust factory. After
the introduction of SAP 5.0, such a production plant would have all its data collected and
stored in one uniﬁed computing system, allowing the plant manager (and all other managers)
to easily access and compare data across a range of processes. For example, if a ﬁlter supplier
were to shut-down due to a ﬁre, the plant manager could use his  system to generate
an on-line inventory of current ﬁlter stocks, a read-out of work-in-progress, and customer
orders outstanding, to evaluate which customer orders were most at risk from shortages. This
would enable him to re-schedule ﬁlter stocks towards the most imminent customer orders,
and pause production of less imminent orders until alternative suppliers could be found. He
would also able to call-up a list of alternative ﬁlters and their suppliers to source a replacement
supplier. Once the local manufacturing sites and the company head quarters are integrated
in the company-wide  system, plant managers and the corporate head quarters have a
full company-level overview of production, inventory, orders and ﬁnance across the company.
Therefore, the development of  enables managers to access timely information at an
unprecedented rate, empowering plant managers to make decisions on a range of activities
including investment, hiring, pricing and product choice.17
Given the theory, we expect ERP to be a decentralizing technology: as all managers have
better access to information, lower level managers can make more decisions without consulting
their superiors. In the data section below we show that indeed, ERP increases information
access by managers.
To sum up, three important technological changes that have been observed:
• A reduction in the cost of communicating information, particularly as a result of the
growth in corporate intranets ().
• An improvement in the access to information by production workers and shop ﬂoor
w o r k e r sa sar e s u l to f and customer databases
• An improvement in the access to information by all managers across the organization as
a result of the introduction of 
We believe that these changes map directly to the theory. Table 1 considers the eﬀects of
16These estimates are from Shepard and Klein, (2006) who conducted 175 interviews with IT managers in
U.S. based companies with 1,000 or more employees. ERP systems are also increasingly common in larger ﬁrms
in developing countries, see for example Bloom et al. (2010).
17By improving the access of managers to local time information  also allows managers to make better
decisions (see Davenport et al, 2002).
14reductions in communication and information costs on three organizational outcomes; plant
manager autonomy in column (1); workers’ autonomy in column (2); and plant manager’s
span in column (3). Falling communication costs (proxied by ) have negative
eﬀects on autonomy and ambiguous eﬀects on spans (each worker does more but will ask
more question). Falling information acquisition costs for non-production decisions (proxied by
) are instead predicted to raise autonomy for plant managers. Finally, falls in information
acquisition costs for production decisions (proxied by ) are predicted to increase
both worker autonomy and plant manager’s span (they can manage more workers if these
workers are making more of their own decisions). To reiterate, the intuition is as in the previous
section: Better information access pushes decisions down, as it allows for superior decentralized
decision making without an undue cognitive burden on those lower in the hierarchy. Better
communication pushes decisions up, as it allows employees to rely on those further up the
hierarchy to make decisions.
3.4 Alternative Theoretical Channels
We close this section with a brief discussion of alternative hypothesis through which ICTs
could aﬀect the allocation of decisions and span and how we might distinguish them from the
cognitive approach we emphasis in this paper.
3.4.1 Agency and Incentives
It is diﬃcult to have a general view of how technology aﬀects agency without being precise
about the channels. Speciﬁcally, would we expect delegation to increase or decrease as a
consequence of ICT improvements? The key characteristic that will aﬀect whether delegation
should increase or decrease is the extent to which technical changes facilitate monitoring inputs
or monitoring outputs. As Prendergast (2002) showed, a technology that results in better
measures of output will increase delegation, as incentives can be used to align decision making.
On the other hand, a technology that facilitates monitoring of inputs will reduce delegation.
Speciﬁc technologies, and speciﬁc instances of the technology, may have stronger impact on
inputs or on outputs. For example, Baker and Hubbard (2004) have argued that a speciﬁc
piece of ICT, the on-board computers used in trucks, decrease the cost of monitoring a trucker’s
level of care in driving (an input). As a result, these on-board computers induced an increase
in vertical integration (less incentives and delegation). The opposite prediction may be easily
the consequence of a particular type of ICT. This may be particularly the case for ,w h i c h
provides better information about agents’ production decisions and so can facilitate delegation
15with monetary incentives.
Absent a speciﬁc technology like on board computers, we believe that there may be multiple
channels through which the technologies that we examine may aﬀect incentive conﬂicts. Rather
than formulating a large range of hypothesis on incentives and decision making, we simply
note that if technology aﬀects output monitoring, it should also aﬀect delegation and incentive
payments. We can explicitly test whether this is driving our results by controlling in our
regressions for the impact of ICT on delegation holding incentives constant. We perform this
exercise in Table A6 by including measures of the importance of incentive pay, and we show
that our key results appear robust to this extension.
3.4.2 Automation
Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003) have argued that the key way ICT impacts the division of
labor is through “automation”. Essentially, their argument is that the routine tasks of both
low human capital workers (like assembly line workers) and higher human capital workers (like
bank clerks) have been replaced by computerization and do not have to be either learned or
undertaken by workers or managers. In a bank, for example, information technology allows for
automatic sorting of checks.
We can extend our model to deal with this type of mechanism. Speciﬁcally, suppose that
aw o r k e ri si nc h a r g eo ft a s k s0 the machine is in charge of tasks  and the manager of tasks
1−0 − The impact of automation is to increase the number of tasks  undertaken by the
machine. Straightforward comparative statics show that the number of tasks undertaken by
a worker is reduced, as the machine does the more routine tasks. Thus a worker does 0 − 
tasks compared to 0 tasks before, while the manager continues to do 1 − 0 tasks, thereby
reducing the share of tasks carried out by worker. The reason is that the marginal value of
learning an additional task does not get increased by the machine doing the most routine task,
so 0 stays constant. The span of control remains unchanged as the number of tasks done by
the manager 1 − 0 are unchanged.
Our data allows testing of this channel since, if any of our ICT measures is having an impact
through automation, then this will reduce the number of tasks done by lower level agents,
reducing their autonomy. By contrast, our perspective predicts increases in the number of
tasks done by lower level agents in response to falls in information acquisition costs. Another
distinguishing feature of our theory is that we obtain speciﬁc predictions on the impact of
networks, which the automation perspective is largely silent on.
163.4.3 Coordination
One key aspect of  is that, in unifying multiple previously unrelated databases, it fa-
cilitates coordination between previously independently operated business units. In fact, by
creating a common language,  facilitates the substitution of ‘hierarchical’ communica-
tion by ‘horizontal’ or peer-to-peer communication, as Cremer, Garicano and Prat (2007) have
noted. As a result, if coordination across units is becoming easier and less hierarchical, we
could also expect (similarly to the eﬀect we predict in our theory) ERP to result in ‘empow-
erment,’ as managers of previously existing business units coordinate with those of others
without going through central management. This could also complement changes in incentives
towards horizontal communication, as in an Alonso et al. (2008) type model.
The pure coordination story where the main impact of the information and communication
changes is to decrease coordination costs, however, will be easy to tell apart from ours. First,
coordination theories do not have implications for spans of control. In fact, if horizontal
communication increases, we will see an increase in the amount of coordination that takes
place, and that could lead to a bigger role for managers and a smaller span when ERP is
introduced (contrary to our hypothesis). Second, if the changes in communication costs also
act through the coordination channel, they should also result in decentralization, rather then
centralization.
In other words, the coordination perspective does not result in a sharp distinction between
information costs ( and ) and communication costs ().B o t h
reduce coordination costs, and thus result in the same impact on decentralization (larger) and
on spans (ambiguous). The data will allow us to diﬀerentiate this perspective from ours, since
we expect changes in information and communication costs to have diﬀerent organizational
outcomes.
4D a t a
We use a new international micro dataset combining novel sources from the US and sev-
eral European countries. Our two main sources of data are the Center for Economic Perfor-
mance (CEP) management and organization survey and the Harte-Hanks ICT panel. We also
match in information from various external data sources such as ﬁrm-level accounting data,
industry and macro-economic data. The full dataset plus all Stata do ﬁles are available on
www.stanford.edu/~nbloom/bsgv.zip
174.1 The CEP management and organization survey
4.1.1 Overview
In the summer of 2006 a team of 51 interviewers ran a management and organizational practices
survey from the CEP (at the London School of Economics) covering over 4,000 ﬁrms across
Europe, the US and Asia. In this paper we use data on approximately 1,000 ﬁrms from the
US, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Sweden and the UK for which we were able
to match the organization data with ICT data from an independent database. Appendix C
provides detailed information on our sources, but we summarize relevant details here.
The CEP survey uses the “double-blind” technique developed in Bloom and Van Reenen
(2007) to try and obtain unbiased accurate responses to the survey questions. One part of
this double-blind methodology is that managers were not told they were being scored in any
way during the telephone survey. The other part of the double blind methodology is that
the interviewers knew nothing about the performance of the ﬁrm as they were not given any
information except the name of the company and a telephone number. Since these ﬁrms are
medium sized, large household names are not included.
The survey is targeted at plant managers in ﬁrms randomly drawn from the population of
all publicly listed and private ﬁrms in the manufacturing sector with between 100 and 5,000
employees. We had a response rate of 45% which was uncorrelated with ﬁrm proﬁtability or
productivity. The interviews took an average of 45 minutes with the interviewers running an
average of 78 interviews each, over a median of 3 countries, allowing us to remove interviewer
ﬁxed eﬀects. We also collected detailed information on the interview process, including the
interview duration, date, time of day, day of the week, and analyst-assessed reliability score,
plus information on the interviewees’ tenure in the company, tenure in the post, seniority and
gender. We generally include these variables plus interviewer ﬁxed-eﬀects as ‘noise-controls’ to
mitigate measurement error.
4.1.2 Measuring Plant Manager Autonomy
As part of this survey we asked four questions on plant manager autonomy. First, we asked how
much capital investment a plant manager could undertake without prior authorization from the
corporate head quarters. This is a continuous variable enumerated in national currency (which
we convert into US dollars using Purchasing Power Parities). We also asked where decisions
were eﬀectively made in three other dimensions: (a) hiring a new full-time permanent shopﬂoor
employee, (b) the introduction of a new product and (c) sales and marketing decisions. These
more qualitative variables were scaled from a score of one, deﬁned as all decisions taken at the
18corporate head quarters, to a ﬁve, deﬁned as complete power (“real authority”) of the plant
manager, and intermediate scores varying degrees of joint decision making. In Table A2 we
detail the individual questions (D1 to D4) and scoring grids in the same order as they appeared
in the survey.
Since the scaling may vary across all these questions, we converted the scores from the four
decentralization questions to z-scores by normalizing each score to have a mean of zero and
standard deviation one. In our main econometric speciﬁcations, we take the unweighted average
across all four z-scores as our primary measure of overall decentralization.18 We show that these
results are robust to other weighting schemes and when the questions are disaggregated into
their component parts.
4.1.3 Measuring Worker Autonomy
During the survey we also asked two questions about worker autonomy over production deci-
sions regarding the pace of work and the allocation of production tasks. These questions were
taken directly from Bresnahan et al. (2002) and are reported in Table A2 (questions D6 and
D 7 ) .T h e s eq u e s t i o n sa r es c a l e do nao n et oﬁve basis, with a one denoting managers have full
control, and a ﬁve denoting workers have full control over the pace of work and allocation of
tasks. Our measure of workers’ autonomy is a dummy taking value one whenever decisions on
both pace of work and allocation of production tasks are mostly taken by workers (i.e. both
variables take values higher than three19). Again, we experiment with other functional forms.
4.1.4 Measuring Span of Control
We also asked about the plant manager’s span of control in terms of the number of people
he directly manages, as reported in Table A1 (question D8). The interviewers were explicitly
trained to probe the number of people that directly report to him rather than the total number
in the hierarchy below him. Unfortunately, we do not have such a direct measure of CHQ span
(since we did not interview the CEO). But we try to get a sense of senior management’s (CHQ)
span of control by asking about whether the ﬁrm was single or multi-plant ﬁrm, with the idea
being that multi-plant ﬁrms lead to larger spans at senior management level.
18The resulting decentralization variable is itself normalized to mean zero and standard deviation one.
19Decisions on pace of work are taken mostly by workers 11% of the times. Similarly, decisions on the
allocation of production tasks, are taken moslty by workers 12% of the times.
194.2 Harte-Hanks’ ICT Data
We use an plant level ICT panel produced by the information company Harte-Hanks (HH). HH
is a multinational ﬁrm that collects detailed hardware and software information to sell to large
ICT ﬁrms, like IBM and Cisco, to use for marketing. This exerts a strong market discipline
on the data quality, as major discrepancies in the data are likely to be rapidly picked up by
HH customers’. For this reason, HH conducts extensive internal random quality checks on its
own data, enabling them to ensure high levels of accuracy.
The HH data has been collected annually for over 160,000 plants across Europe since the
late-1990s. They target plants in ﬁrms with 100 or more employees, obtaining a 37% response
rate. We use the data for the plants we were able to match to the ﬁrms in the management
survey. Since this matching procedure sometimes leads to multiple plants sampled in HH per
ﬁrm, we aggregate ICT plant level data pooled across 2000 to 2006 (i.e. prior to the to the
CEP organization survey) to the ﬁrm level, using plant employment weights. A number of
papers, such as Bresnahan et al (2002), Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2003), Beaudry et al (2006)
and Forman et al (2011), have previously used the US HH hardware data, but few papers have
used the software data. And certainly no one has combined the software data with information
on organizational form in a single country, let alone internationally as we do here.
The prior literature, which has focused on hardware, has typically used information on
ﬁrms aggregate ICT capital stock covering PCs, servers and infrastructure. But since these
simultaneously reduce information and communication costs we do not expect a clear result.
Our approach consists instead in considering the presence of speciﬁc technologies within the
organization, namely: networks, to proxy for communication costs; Enterprise Resource Plan-
ning (), to capture the reduction in information access costs for non-production decisions;
and  to capture the reduction in information access costs for production decisions.
This is depicted in relation to the model in Figure 4.
[Figure 4 about here]
HH contains information on the presence of all of these software types in the plant.
• HH distinguishes up to 17 distinct types of : the market leader is SAP, but Or-
acle, IBM and many others all oﬀer products in this space. HH tries to record only
ERP systems in operation (rather then those pending the go-live decision) which Aral,
Brynjolfsson and Wu (2009) highlight as important.
20• HH deﬁnes under “workstation applications” the presence of ’s, software
tools that assist production workers, engineers and machinists.
• HH measures the presence of Leased Lines or Frame Relays (), which are
technologies used by businesses to connect oﬃces or production sites.20 We have, in
some years, direct information on Local Area Networks (LAN) and Wide Area Networks
(WAN) and ﬁnd these to be both highly correlated with our  variable. In
the robustness tests we show the similarity of results when using this as an alternative
proxy for networks.
The presence of any of these technologies at the plant level is codiﬁed using binary variables,
and plant level employment weights are used to generate ﬁrm level indicators.21 In terms of
other technologies we condition on computers per worker, but note its theoretical ambiguity.
4.3 Does ERP mainly lower information costs rather than communication
costs?
We have argued in Section 2 that  reduces information costs much more than communi-
cation costs, but this may be contentious. To investigate this issue in more detail, we collected
data in a survey of IT managers on  usage in 431 ﬁrms with 100 to 5000 employees (details
in Appendix B). Brieﬂy, we asked managers speciﬁcally what was the impact of  in their
companies with regards to information and communication. Following the theory, we asked
them whether  was “used to endow top management with more and better information”
and respondents could answer on a Likert scale of 1 = “strongly disagree” to 5 = “strongly
agree”. About three quarters of respondents said that  was “likely” or “very likely” to
increase information ﬂows (see Q1 in Figure A1). We also asked whether “ERP is used for
faster communication of information and directives from top management to other employees”
(again from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree). Only about a third of respondents
answered that  was “likely” or “very likely” to increase this form of communication (see
Panel Q2 in Figure A1). Using the cardinal scale, the mean of the information acquisition
answer was 3.8, whereas the mean of the communication answer was 2.8 with the diﬀerence
20A leased line is a symmetric telecommunications line connecting two locations. It is sometimes known as a
‘Private Circuit’ or ‘Data Line’. Unlike traditional PSTN lines, a leased line does not have a telephone number,
because each side of the line is permanently connected to the other. Leased lines can be used for telephone,
data or Internet services. Frame relay is a data transmission technique used to send digital information (data
and voice) cheaply quickly, and is often used in local and wide area networks. These systems are predominantly
used to manage internal communication systems. They are not speciﬁcally about production or non-production
decisions, but aﬀects communication through out the ﬁrm.
21The resulting variables have mass points at zero or one.We present robustness tests using just the discrete
versions of these technology indicators.
21signiﬁcant at the 1% level. A similar pattern is evident when respondents where asked about
information acquisition vs. communication for middle managers (see Panels Q3 and Q4 in Fig-
ure A1). Appendix B has some further analysis, but this empirical evidence corroborates our
discussions with technology experts that  is primarily related to information acquisition
rather than communication.
4.4 Other Data
In addition to the organization variable, the CEP survey also provides a wide variety of other
variables such as human capital, demographics and management practices. Also, since the
CEP survey used accounting databases as our sampling frames from BVD (Amadeus in Europe
and ICARUS in the US), we have the usual accounting information for most ﬁrms, such as
employment, sales, industry, location, etc. Table 2 contains some descriptive statistics of the
data we use. In the largest sample we have 950 plants with mean employment of 250 employees
(153 at the median).
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Econometric Model
We wish to estimate the following generic equation:
 =  +  + 0
 +  (4)
where the dependent variable is  which denotes the organizational form of ﬁrm  in industry
 in country .O u r t h e o r y o ﬀers predictions over four types of organizational outcomes for
which we have data: the autonomy of the worker ( = AW), the autonomy of the plant
manager ( = AP), the span of control of the plant manager ( = SP) and the span of control
of the CHQ ( = SC). As in the theory,  denotes information access costs and  denotes
communication (helping) costs. The  denote other control variables and  is a stochastic
error term - we will discuss these in more detail later.
As discussed in the data section, we have direct measures of workers’ autonomy, managers’
autonomy and managers’ span of control from our survey. The management autonomy ques-
tions investigate the extent of “non-production” autonomy the plant manager has from the
corporate head quarters (e.g. how much investment could be made without corporate head
quarters’ approval). The worker autonomy questions relate to decisions the worker could have
control over compared to the plant manager (e.g. setting the pace of work).
22The information costs and communication costs facing the ﬁrm are not directly observ-
able, but we substitute in the relevant indicator from HH ( lowers ;  and
 lower ). To be more explicit the three regressions we will estimate are:
Autonomy of the plant managers (AP)
 =  +  + 0
 + 
 (5)
Autonomy of the worker (AW)
 = () + 
  + 0
 + 
 (6)





Recall that Table 1 contains the main theoretical predictions of the model that we have
sketched together with the technologies we are using. Falls in information costs are associated
with greater plant manager autonomy and workers’ autonomy, and larger spans of control.
By contrast, falls in communication costs are associated with decreases in autonomy and
ambiguous eﬀects on spans.
We have a rich set of controls to draw on (), although we are careful about conditioning
on factors that are also directly inﬂuenced by technology. Consequently we consider speciﬁ-
cations with very basic controls as well as those with a more extensive vector of covariates.
Since there is measurement error in the organizational variables we generally condition on
“noise controls” that include interviewer ﬁxed eﬀects and interviewee controls (e.g. tenure of
manager) and interview controls (e.g. time of day). Other controls include a full set of three
digit industry and country dummies, plant age, skills (share of college educated workers), ﬁrm
and plant size and multinational status. We also perform robustness checks with many other
variables suggested in the literature which may potentially confound our key results.
5.2 Basic Results
Tables 3 through 5 present the main results. Each table has a diﬀerent dependent variable
and corresponds to equations (5) to (7). Table 3 contains the empirical results for plant
managers’ autonomy. All columns control for size (through employment of the ﬁrm and the
plant), multinational status (foreign multinational or domestic multinational with the base as
23a purely domestic ﬁrm), whether the CEO is located on the same site as the plant manager,22
“noise” controls as discussed in the data section and a full set of country and three digit
industry dummies. Column (1) uses the presence of Enterprise Resource Planning ()a sa
measure of information acquisition over non-production decisions. As the theory predicts, 
is associated with more autonomy of plant managers (relative to the corporate head quarters)
as the plant manager is allowed greater ﬂexibility in making decisions over investment, hiring,
marketing and product introduction.23In our model this is because  enables him to access
information more easily and solve more problems without referring them upwards. In terms of
the other covariates we ﬁnd that larger and more complex enterprises (as indicated by size and
multinational status) are more likely to decentralize decision-making to the plant manager.
Column (2) includes ﬁrm level skills, as measured by the proportion of employees with college
degrees. The variable takes a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient, indicating that more skilled
workplaces tend to be more decentralized (consistent with Caroli and Van Reenen, 2001).
This column also includes the computer intensity of plant which enters with a negative and
insigniﬁcant sign. The ambiguity of the IT hardware variable should not be surprising as
greater computer intensity simultaneously lowers information costs and communication costs
which, according to our theoretical model, have opposite eﬀects on autonomy. Despite the
extra controls, the coeﬃcient on  remains signiﬁcantly positive.
The third column of Table 3 reports the same speciﬁcation as column (1), but instead of
 we use an indicator for the presence of networks, which indicates lower communication
costs. As the theory predicts, there is a negative coeﬃcient on the network variable which our
theory suggests reﬂects the fact that lower communication costs imply that corporate head
quarters make more decisions than the plant manager as it is now easier to pass on solutions.
This result is robust to including skills and computer intensity in column (4). Columns (5) and
(6) includes both information and communications technologies at the same time. Since these
are positively correlated, the results are stronger with both variables signiﬁcant and correctly
signed.24 Table 3 is consistent with the theoretical model sketched earlier: falling information
costs are associated with decentralization, whereas falling communication costs are associated
22All results are robust to dropping size, multinational and CEO on site controls (results available on
www.stanford.edu/~nbloom/bsgv.zip). Note that ﬁrms where the CEO was the same individual as the plant
manager are dropped.
23We investigate the endogeneity of the technology variables in depth in Table 6. One inital check on whether
the OLS results are upwards biased is to implement a propensity score matching technique. We found that
matching strengthened the results. For example in the speciﬁcation of column (2) of Table 3, the Average
Treatment eﬀect on the Treated was 0.194 with a standard error of 0.102. This used nearest neighbors matching
with three neighbors.
24The results are robust to clustering at a higher level, such as by industry country cell. For example, in the
ﬁnal column the coeﬃcients (standard errors) are 0.192(0.085) and -0.188(0.096)
24with centralization.
The next two tables analyze the relationship between information and communication
technologies with workers’ autonomy and plant manager span of control (this follows exactly
the order of Table 3). Table 4 is a probit model of workers’ autonomy where our indicator
of information acquisition over production decisions is . In columns (1) and (2),
the coeﬃcient on  is positive and signiﬁcant, indicating that such technologies are
associated with worker empowerment. In columns (3) and (4), by contrast, the presence of
networks has a negative coeﬃcient which is consistent with the theoretical notion that greater
communication leads to centralization. Although the coeﬃcient on  is correctly
signed, it is insigniﬁcant even when both technologies are included simultaneously (in the ﬁnal
two columns).
Table 5 examines the plant manager’s span of control as measured by the number of em-
ployees who directly report to him.  is associated with signiﬁcantly greater plant
manager span, consistent with the idea that production technologies that help worker infor-
mation access enable them to do more tasks which makes it possible for the plant manager to
oversee more production workers (greater span). The coeﬃcient on  is negative
and insigniﬁcant (the theory does not have an unambiguous prediction for this coeﬃcient).
Comparing the empirical results with our expectations in Table 1, we obtain a reasonably
close match. All the coeﬃcients are in the same direction as the theoretical predictions (when
they are unambiguous) and all are signiﬁcant at the 5% level in the most general speciﬁca-
tions (with the exception of  in the worker autonomy equation). The idea that
information technologies are associated with increased autonomy and span of control, whereas
communications technologies are associated with decreased autonomy appears to have some
empirical content. By contrast, the automation story would predict information technologies
should be associated with centralization away from lower level employees and the coordination
theories would predict that communication technologies should be associated with decentral-
ization (see sub-section 3.3.). Thus, we interpret our evidence on ICT and ﬁrm organization
as providing some support for the cognitive view of hierarchies in section 2.
5.3 Magnitudes
Although the estimates are statistically signiﬁcant and broadly consistent with our theory, are
they of economic signiﬁcance? One way of examining this question is to simulate an increase in
the diﬀusion of our ICT indicators. Given the debate over whether the increasing productivity
gap between Europe and the US in the decade since 1995 was related to ICT (e.g. Bloom,
25Sadun and Van Reenen, 2011), we simulate increasing the ICT diﬀusion measures by 60% (the
diﬀerence in the average level of the ICT capital stock per hour worked between the EU and
the US 2000-2004).25
An increase in the penetration of  of 60% over the sample average of 34% is about
20 percentage points. Using the ﬁnal column of Table 3, this is associated with a 0.038 of
a standard deviation increase in plant manager autonomy. This is equivalent in eﬀect to
an increase in the proportion of college graduates by 38% which is a third higher than the
increase in education achieved by the US between 1990 and 2000 of about 24%. So we regard
this as a very substantial eﬀect. Similar calculations show that increasing the penetration of
 by 60% (21 percentage points at the mean) is associated with a decrease in plant
manager’s autonomy by 0.04 standard deviations, equivalent to reducing the college share by
38%. This same increase in  is associated with a decrease in worker autonomy
of 0.08 standard deviations (equivalent to a 28% fall in the college share). So the “eﬀect” of
falling communication costs () appears somewhat greater for plant manager than
for worker autonomy. Finally, consider a 60% increase in . This is associated with
a 0.4% increase in plant manager’s span (equivalent to a 9.5% in the college share) and a 1.6%
increase in worker autonomy (equivalent to 5.5% increase in the college share). This is lower
because the mean of  is lower than the other technologies.
This implies that these technical changes appear very important for some aspects of organi-
zation (benchmarked against equivalent increases in skills), especially  on plant manager’s
autonomy and  on all three organizational dimensions.
5.4 Extensions and Robustness
5.4.1 Endogeneity
Tables 3 through 5 present conditional correlations that seemed to be broadly consistent with
the theory. The theoretical model suggests that the endogenous outcomes should covary in
systematic ways in equilibrium which is what we examine in the data. We are of course con-
cerned about endogeneity bias as there may be some unobservable that is correlated with the
organizational outcomes and our measures of information and communication costs (especially
as these are all measured at the ﬁr ml e v e l ) .W et a k es o m er e a s s u r a n c ei nt h ef a c tt h a ta l t h o u g h
these ICT indicators are positively correlated in the data,26 their predicted eﬀects on the same
25This is based on the EU KLEMS data. See Timmer, Yppa and Van Ark (2003) Table 5 for a similar ﬁgure
for 2001 and a description of the data.
26For example, the pairwise correlation between the  and the  variables is 0.168, signiﬁcant
at the 1% level.
26organizational variable can take opposite signs. For example, in the plant manager autonomy
equation the coeﬃcient on information acquisition technologies (proxied by )i so p p o -
site in sign to communication technologies () both theoretically and empirically.
For endogeneity to generate these results, the hypothetical unobservable positively correlated
with decentralization would have to mimic this pattern of having a negative covariance with
 and a positive covariance with . This is always a theoretical possibility,
but it is not obvious what would generate these covariance patterns.
In this sub-section we consider instrumental variable strategies for  and .27
SAP is the market leader in  and was founded by ﬁve IBM engineers who formed their
start-up in Walldorf, a suburb of the German city of Heidelberg in 1972 (e.g. Hagiu et al,
2007). SAP’s Headquarters remains in Walldorf. Studies of diﬀusion suggest that geography
plays an important role because when there is uncertainty and tacit knowledge. Being ge-
ographically close to the innovator plays a role in the adoption of the new technology (e.g.
Baptista, 2000). Studies of the diﬀusion of  (e.g. Armbruster et al, 2005) suggest that
ﬁrms closer to SAP’s headquarters were more likely to be early adopters all else equal. Since
our ﬁrms are medium sized enterprises who could also learn from these earlier adopters (
is more common among very large enterprises), we use the closeness to Walldorf as an exoge-
nous factor that shifts the probability of adopting an . We focus on Continental Europe
as the US and UK are separated by sea from Germany, and drop subsidiaries of multinational
ﬁrms as it is harder to pinpoint the appropriate distance measure for such global ﬁrms.
We regress the presence of  in the plant on the ln(distance in kilometers) to Walldorf
in Column (1) of Table 6. Consistent with our priors, a ﬁrm twice as far as another from
Walldorf is signiﬁcantly less likely (around 24%) to adopt an  system. When entered
instead of  in the plant manager autonomy equation (the “reduced form” of column (2)),
the coeﬃcient on distance is again negative and (weakly) signiﬁcant. Column (3) presents the
instrumental variable results, showing that  has a large and positive causal eﬀect on de-
centralization. We also ran these regressions on the larger sample that includes multinationals
with similar results.28
In the sample of Table 6 there are 45% of ﬁrms with , of whom 30% use SAP and
70% use a variety of other  oﬀered by vendors like Oracle, Sage and Microsoft. Since
our instrumental variable should be most powerful for SAP we repeated the speciﬁcations of
27We do not have an obvious instrumental variable for , so we can only re-estimate Table 3 using
this alternative identiﬁcation strategy.
28As expected the ﬁrst stage was weaker, with a coeﬃcient (standard error) on distance of -0.087 (0.052).
Nevertheless, the second stage remained signiﬁcant with a coeﬃcient (standard error) on  of 1.906 (1.101).
27columns (1)-(3) replacing  with a dummy for the presence of SAP’s  only. The
ﬁrst stage results are much stronger: the coeﬃcient (standard error) on distance was -0.094
(0.029) and the second stage coeﬃcient on  was 1.770 (1.032). In fact, the instrument
has no power at all for predicting non-SAP  systems. Given the distance to Walldorf
only predicts the adoption of SAP  and not other makes of  this suggests it reﬂects
some SAP eﬀect rather than some other unobservable favorable to  adoption. Note that
the magnitude of the eﬀect is much larger than in the simple OLS speciﬁcations. This could
be due to correcting attenuation bias from measurement error and/or reverse causality - for
example, plants which are for some exogenous reason more decentralized may ﬁnd it diﬃcult to
coordinate on introducing an  system which will require some consolidation of databases.
We consider an alternative approach to identifying the eﬀects of networks. The cost of
electronically communicating over networks diﬀers substantially between countries because of
diﬀerential degrees of the roll-out of high speed bandwidth and the pricing of telecommuni-
cations. Although there have been moves to liberalize the telecommunication sector in most
countries, this has happened at very diﬀerent speeds and in some countries the incumbent
state run (or formerly state run) monopolists retain considerable pricing power (e.g. Nicoletti
and Scarpetta, 2003; Azmat et al, 2008; OECD, 2005, 2007). We discuss these in more detail
Appendix C.
We exploit these diﬀerential costs using OECD (2007) series on the prices of leased lines
used for networks (call this price 
), which represent the cost of an annual subscription to a
leased line contract at 2006 PPP US$. An obvious empirical problem is that these measured
telecommunication price indices only vary across countries29 and not within countries, so they
are collinear with the country dummies. Industries will be diﬀerentially aﬀected by these
costs, however, depending on the degree to which they are reliant on networks for exogenous
technological reasons. We proxy this reliance by using the intensity of network use in the
industry pooling the data across all countries ().30 The instrument is deﬁned
as 
 ∗  Since we also include a full set of industry and country dummies we
are essentially using 
 ∗ as a direct proxy for communication costs, ,w i t ht h e
prediction that for the network-intensive industries we would expect to see more managerial
autonomy in countries where communication prices are high (like Poland) than where they are
low (like Sweden). The results for this experiment are presented in columns (4)-(6) of Table 6
29This is only partially true as there is some within country variation. For example, the roll-out of broadband
proceeds at a diﬀerent rate across areas (see Stephenson, 2006).
30This identiﬁcation strategy parallels Rajan and Zingales (1998) We also considered speciﬁcations where we
used network intensive industries deﬁned on US data only and dropped the US from the sample we estimated
on. This generated similar results.
28(we can use a larger sample than in the ﬁr s tt h r e ec o l u m n sa sw eh a v em o r ec o u n t r i e s ) .H i g h
telecommunications costs signiﬁcantly reduce the probability of having a network in column
(4). When this is entered in the reduced form in column (5), the variable enters with the
expected positive sign: less networks imply more decentralization. In column (6), the second
stage coeﬃcient is large, negative and signiﬁcant as predicted by the theory.31
The ﬁnal column of Table 6 uses both instruments together. Both coeﬃcients take their
expected sign and are similar in magnitude to columns (3) and (6). Unfortunately only the
 coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at the 10% level. The problem is that although the distance to
Walldorf is signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst stage for , the instrument for networks has no power in
this smaller sub-sample where it is appropriate to use the distance to Walldorf IV.
Taking Table 6 as a whole suggests that the eﬀects we identify are more likely to be causal
impacts of technology on organizational form, rather than simply reﬂecting an endogeneity
problem.
5.4.2 “Cross” Eﬀects of Technologies
We now consider some of the further “cross” eﬀects of technologies by saturating the empirical
models with all three types of technologies. Table A3 presents the full set of predictions from the
theory analogously to Table 1. We present the most general speciﬁcations for each of the three
main organizational variables in Table A4. The ﬁrst thing to note is that none of the earlier
conclusions change with respect to the earlier tests:  are associated with less
autonomy,  is associated with more autonomy for managers and  is associated
with more autonomy for workers and a larger span of control. In terms of additional tests,
the ﬁrst column of Table A4 includes  in the plant managers’ autonomy equation.
This is insigniﬁcant, in line with the theoretical predictions of a zero eﬀect. The second and
third columns includes  in the workers’ autonomy and span of control regressions. In
both cases  takes a positive coeﬃcient. This is contrary to the theory as  should be
negative. We do not regard this as undermining our general set-up, however, as the coeﬃcients
are in both cases insigniﬁcant. The robustness of the earlier results to these “cross eﬀects” is
reassuring, but the insigniﬁcance of the extra terms does imply that it is diﬃcult to pick up
some of the more subtle cross eﬀects of ICTs on ﬁrm organization.
31For example, we included regional ln(GDP per head) and ln(population) in columns 3 and 6 of Table 5.
The coeﬃcient (standard error) on  and  were 1.669 (.626) and -2.970 (1.652) respectively.
295.4.3 Corporate Head Quarters’ Span of Control
Table A3 showed that the theory also generates predictions for the span of control of the
corporate head quarters (CHQ). Although we had a direct measure of the plant managers’
s p a n( n u m b e ro fd i r e c tr e p o r t s )w ed on o th a v es u c had i r e c tm e a s u r ef o rt h eC H Qs p a n .
One proxy measure for this, however, is the number of plants in the ﬁrm, with more plants
indicating a larger CHQ span. Because this variable is likely measured with error we simply
consider a dummy for a multiplant ﬁrm as a measure of the CHQ span and regress this on
information acquisition technology for the Plant Manager ()a n d in Table
A5. The clear theoretical prediction is that  should be associated with a wider CHQ
span because plant managers are able to make decisions more easily so CHQ ﬁnds it easier
to manage a larger number of them. This is supported by Table A5, ERP has a signiﬁcant
and positive association with CHQ span of control in column (1) where we condition on the
standard controls and column (3) where we also condition on .32 The coeﬃcient
on  is positive and signiﬁcant in column (2) - it has a theoretically ambiguous
sign.
5.4.4 An alternative mechanism: Incentives
At the end of the theory section we discussed alternative mechanisms, such as agency and
incentives, through which ICT could aﬀect organizational structure. We argued that the cog-
nitive approach we take here is ﬁrst order, although incentives may still of course be important.
One simple way to investigate this is to explicitly condition on incentive pay in the regressions.
From the survey we know the proportion of managerial pay that was in bonus (direct incentive
pay) and the increase in pay upon promotion (a career concerns mechanism).
Columns (1) through (3) of Table A6 include a variable indicating the proportion of the
plant manager’s pay that was bonus (rather than ﬂat salary).33 Columns (4) through (6)
includes the proportionate increase in pay when promoted for a typical plant manager. It is
clear that the signs and signiﬁcance of the technology variables are hardly aﬀected by this
additional variable. For example, in column (1) the incentive pay variable is positively but
insigniﬁcantly associated with greater autonomy of the plant manager. The coeﬃcient on 
is 0.193 and the coeﬃcient on  is -0.187, both basically unchanged from Table
3. The other incentive pay proxies are insigniﬁcant and do not change the qualitative results.
Obviously, this is a crude test as there are other dimensions of incentive pay we have not
32If we also include  the  coeﬃcient remains positive and signiﬁcant. The theory predicts a
zero eﬀect of  which indeed has an insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient (-0.389 with a standard error of 0.432).
33See Lemieux, MacLeod and Parent (2007) for how performance pay has grown in importance over time.
30captured (e.g. for production workers) and some incentive eﬀects may operate independently
of any remuneration scheme. But the robustness of our results to explicit controls for incentives
suggest that there is a role for the cognitive theory we emphasis when looking at the impact
of ICT.
5.4.5 Further Results
We have examined a large variety of robustness tests and some of these are presented in Table
7. Each panel presents a diﬀerent dependent variable with diﬀerent tests in each column (Panel
A for plant manager autonomy, Panel B for worker autonomy and Panel C for plant manager
span of control ). Column (1) simply repeats the baseline speciﬁcations from the ﬁnal column
in Tables 3 through 5.
In Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen (2009) we found that product market competition and
cultural factors such as trust and non-hierarchical religions were associated with greater plant
manager autonomy. We control for these in column (2) by including a full set of regional
dummies and the industry-level Lerner Index of competition. None of the main results change,
with the exception of in the worker autonomy equation. The sign is still negative,
which is consistent with the theory (falls in communication cost lower autonomy) but it is now
larger in absolute magnitude and signiﬁcant at the 10% level, whereas it was insigniﬁcant
in the baseline regression. Column (3) includes a variety of additional ﬁrm level controls:
the capital-labor ratio, sales per employee, total employment in the group where the ﬁrm
belongs (i.e. consolidated worldwide employment for multinationals), ﬁrm age and a listing
dummy. The results are robust to these additional controls (which were individually and jointly
insigniﬁcant). Column (4) uses an alternative indicator of networks based on the presence of
LAN (Local Area Networks) or WAN (Wide Area Networks).34 The LAN/WAN indicator
is highly correlated with  and the results are very similar to the baseline. The
only diﬀerence is that, again,  in the worker autonomy equation which is now
signiﬁcant (at the 10% level) with a theory consistent negative sign. Again, nothing much
changes, nor does including the Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) measure of management quality
in column (5). Column (6) considers alternative ways of constructing the dependent variable.
For the plant manager autonomy equation we use the principal component of the four questions
and for the worker autonomy question we deﬁne it based only on the pace of work.35 The
34We prefer our indicator of  as LAN was included only in earlier years of the Harte-Hanks data
and WAN only in later years.
35The results are also robust to constructing the plant manager autonomy variable focusing solely on questions
coded between 1 and 5, i.e. excluding the question on how much capital investment a plant manager could
undertake without prior authorization from CHQ.
31results again seem robust to these alternatives. Column (7) drops the size controls as they are
potentially endogenous and column (8) conditions on the sub-sample with at least three ﬁrms
per industry. Neither experiment has much eﬀect on the results.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
The empirical and theoretical literature that examines the economic eﬀects of information and
communication technologies (ICT) generally aggregates together the information technology
(IT) and communication technology (CT) into a single homogeneous mass. We argue that
this is inappropriate because the impact of IT and CT on the organization of ﬁrms, and
ultimately income inequality, will be quite diﬀerent depending on the type of technology. Falls
in communication costs will tend to reduce employee autonomy, as decisions will be passed up
to the centre of the ﬁrm. Falls in information acquisition costs will have the opposite eﬀect,
facilitating more eﬀective employee decision-making.
We show these eﬀects formally in a “cognitive” model of ﬁrm organization which considers
two types of decisions within ﬁrms. First, we consider non-production decisions (investment,
hiring, new products and pricing). These decisions can either be taken by the CEO at corporate
head quarters or by the plant manager in the local business unit. The key piece of information
technology that has aﬀected these decisions is Enterprise Resource Planning.  provides
a range of data on metrics like production, waste, energy use, sales, inventories and human
resources. Modern  systems increase dramatically the availability of information to man-
agers, which should (according to our theory) be associated with decentralization of decision
making.
Second, we consider factory ﬂoor decisions, on the allocation and pace of production tasks.
These production decisions can either be taken by factory ﬂoor employees or by their superiors
in the plant hierarchy, like the plant managers. Here, a key technological change has taken the
adoption of Computer Assisted Design and Computer Assisted Manufacturing ().
A worker with access to those technologies can solve design and production problems better,
and thus needs less access to his superiors in making decisions. This should lead to the
decentralization of non-production decisions.
Of course both production and non-production decisions will also be impacted by reducing
communication costs. The key technological innovation in within-ﬁrm communications is the
growth of networks. The spread of networks should therefore be associated with centralization
of both types of decisions within the ﬁrm, as decision making is more easily passed up the ﬁrm
to higher level managers.
32We conﬁrm these predictions on a new dataset that combines plant-level measures of organi-
zation and ICT hardware and software adoption across the US and Europe. The organizational
questions were collected as part our large international management survey, and were explicitly
targeted at the theories we investigate.
In terms of identiﬁcation, we mainly focus on simple conditional correlations between the
diﬀerent ICT measures and the multiple dimensions of the organization of the ﬁrm, guided
by our theoretical predictions. But we also show that treating technology as endogenous
strengthen the results. Our instrumental variables are distance from the birthplace of the
market leading  system (SAP) and the diﬀerential regulation of the telecommunication
industry across countries (which generates exogenous diﬀerences in the eﬀective prices of net-
works).
There are several directions we are currently pursuing in this line of research. Firstly,
we are examining in more detail the reasons for diﬀerential adoptions of technologies across
ﬁrms and countries as the instruments suggest important factors that could explain the diﬀu-
sion of communication and information technologies. This is of interest in itself, but is also
important in order to get more closely at the causal eﬀects of changes in ICT on ﬁrm organi-
zation. Secondly, we are developing the theory to consider interactions between diﬀerent type
of production and non-production technologies at other layers of the hierarchy. Finally, we are
examining the eﬀect of diﬀerential type of IT adoption on other outcomes such as productivity
and wage inequality at the level of the industry and economy.
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APPENDICES
AA p p e n d i x A : P r o o f s
Recall the value of a ﬁrm with three layers is ∗ =m a x  1 − ( + ) − ( +  +
)(1 − ()) − ( + )2(1 − ())(1 − ()) To show proposition 2, ﬁrst take ﬁrst
order conditions with respect to the two types of decisions,  and  These are:
 : − +( (  +  + )+(  + )(1 − ()))()=0
 :[ − +(  + )())](1 − ()) = 0
To sign the Hessian, note ﬁrst that the second cross derivatives are 0 at the optimum. To see
this take the second order condition


=[  − ( + )())]()
Optimality when managers are used requires that [−+(+)())] = 0 (since ()  1
or else workers work on their own as they know everything), and thus the Hessian is:
 =
µ
(( +  + )+(  + )(1 − ())0()0
0 ( + )0()
¶
Since 0()  0 and 0()  0 (management by exception— those higher up specialized in






















(( +  + )+2 ( + )(1 − ())()
( + )()
¶
Let the vector  =(  ) .Then for each parameter, 







































For the eﬀects in span, simply note that the span of control of corporate managers is  =





































To get the table in the paper, note that the predictions are with respect to a fall in these
costs and thus all of the signs must be reversed to obtain the prediction.
Finally, note also that if we let  be also the acquisition cost of CEOs, so that  aﬀects
both CEOs and plant managers equally nothing changes (as the proposition states), so that
 = .T h eﬁrst foc becomes  : −+(( +  + )+(  + )(1 − ())(),





















B Appendix B: Survey of IT Managers on the Impact of ERP
In the Summer and Fall of 2008 Kretschmer and Mahr (2009) conducted a survey of IT man-
agers in medium-sized (100 to 5,000 employees) German and Polish ﬁrms that were randomly
chosen from the population of manufacturing ﬁrms. The aims of the survey were wider than
just  and collected information on management and other factors. At our request some
questions on the use of  were inserted. Answers to the questions were on a Likert Scale
from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree. The key questions for our purposes were the
following:
Q21 “Our ERP system is used to endow top management with more and better infor-
mation”
Q24 “Our ERP system is used to endow middle managers with more and better infor-
mation”
Q23 “Our ERP system is used to faster communicate information and directives from
top management to employees”
Q26 “Our ERP system is used to faster communicate information and directives from
middle management to employees”
Figure A1 shows the distribution of answers to these questions. It is clear from this ﬁgure
that most respondents were likely (a “4”) or very likely (a “5”) to agree with statements Q21
and Q24 suggesting  was related to information acquisition. By contrast, as many people
disagreed as agreed with the statements in Q23 and Q26 that  lowers communication
costs. The mean of the information question is 3.8 for Q24 and 4.03 for Q21 whereas for the
communication question it is 2.76 for Q23 and 2.71 for Q26.
Table A1 shows regression versions of these descriptive statistics. Likert scales between
respondents can be biased because each respondent implicitly has a diﬀerent scaling when
they answer such questions (Manski, 2004). We can deal with this by only comparing “within
respondent”, i.e. looking at the relative responses for the same individual across questions.
We construct several such variables, but the key one is “DIF1” the absolute diﬀerence between
“Our ERP system is used to endow middle managers with more and better information”
(Q24) and “Our ERP system is used to faster communicate information and directives from
top management to employees” (Q23). This is an index from -4 to 4 indicating the degree
to which  reduces information costs relative to communication costs. A positive value
of this index indicates that managers are more likely to view  as improving information
costs rather than reducing communication costs.
39Column (1) of Table A1 shows that the mean value of this index is just above one and
signiﬁcantly greater than zero - if  was on average thought to be equally important
for communication as for information acquisition, the coeﬃcient on the constant would be
insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. This is consistent with our assumption that  is used
more as an information acquisition tool than a communication tool. We condition on some
confounding inﬂuences - country dummies, industry dummies and size in column (2) which
shows the diﬀerence is robust. One might be concerned that the communication question relates
t ot o pm a n a g e r s ,s ow ea l s ou s e d“ D I F 2 ”w h i c hk e e p st h ei n f o r m a t i o nq u e s t i o nt h es a m e( Q 2 1 )
but deducts “Our ERP system is used to faster communicate information and directives from
middle management to employees” (Q26). The results of using this as a dependent variable
are in column (3) which are almost identical to column (2). Finally we checked whether 
is better at endowing top management with more information than middle management by
constructing “DIF3” the absolute diﬀerence between “Our ERP system is used to endow middle
managers with more and better information” (Q24) and “Our ERP system is used to endow
top management with more and better information” (Q21). This diﬀerence is positive but
completely insigniﬁcant. In terms of our theory this means that ERP shifts  downwards to
a similar extent as  which is again, what we assumed for our interpretation of the empirical
results36 See Kretschmer and Mahr (2009) for full details on the underlying survey.
C Appendix C: Data Appendix
C.1 CEP Management and Innovation Survey Dataset
C.1.1 The Survey Sampling Frame
We use a sub-set of the CEP Management and Organization survey in this paper (see Bloom,
Sadun and Van Reenen, 2009, for full details of larger sample) where we have ICT data (see
below). Our sampling frame was based on the Bureau van Dijk (BVD) Amadeus dataset
for Europe (France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Sweden and the U.K.) and Icarus for
the US. These databases all provide suﬃcient information on companies to conduct a stratiﬁed
telephone survey (company name, address and a size indicator). These databases also typically
have some accounting information, such employment, sales of capital assets. Apart from size,
we did not insist on having accounting information to form the sampling population, however.
Amadeus is constructed from a range of sources, primarily the national registries of compa-
nies (such as Companies House in the UK). Icarus is constructed from the Dun & Bradstreet
database, which is a private database of over 5 million US trading locations built up from
credit records, business telephone directories and direct research. In every country the sam-
pling frame was all ﬁrms with a manufacturing primary industry code with between 100 and
5,000 employees on average over the most recent three years of data (typically 2002 to 2004).37
Interviewers were each given a randomly selected list of ﬁrms from the sampling frame.
This should therefore be representative of medium sized manufacturing ﬁrms. The size of the
sampling frame appears broadly proportional to the absolute size of each country’s manufac-
turing base, the US, has the most ﬁrms and Sweden and Portugal the least.38 In addition to
randomly surveying from the sampling frame described above we also tried to resurvey the
ﬁrms we interviewed in the 2004 survey wave used in Bloom and Van Reenen (2007). This
was a sample of 732 ﬁrms from France, Germany, the UK and the US, with a manufacturing
36There are diﬀerences in the comparative statistcs if  or another technology reduced  but not 
37In the US only the most recent year of employment is provided. In Portugal the population of ﬁrms with
100 to 5000 employees was only 242, so we supplemented this with the 72 ﬁr m sw i t h7 5t o1 0 0e m p l o y e e s .W e
c h e c k e dt h er e s u l t sb yc o n d i t i o n i n go nc o m m o ns i z eb a n d s( a b o v e1 5 0i na l lc o u n t r i e s ) .
38The size of the manufacturing sector can be obtained from http://laborsta.ilo.org/, a database maintained
by ILO.
40primary industry code and 50 to 10,000 employees (on average between 2000 and 2003). This
sample was drawn from the Amadeus dataset for Europe and the Compustat dataset for the
U.S. Only companies with accounting data were selected.39 As a robustness test we also drop
the ﬁrms that were resurveyed from 2004.
C.1.2 Sample Representativeness
Comparing the aggregate number of employees for diﬀerent size bands from our sampling
frame with the ﬁgures for the corresponding manufacturing populations in each of the countries
(obtained from national census data), we ﬁnd that in all countries but two the sampling frame
broadly matches up with the population of medium sized manufacturing ﬁrms. This suggests
our sampling frame covers the population of all ﬁrms. In Germany and Portugal the coverage
is less complete as the frame appears to cover around a third of manufacturing employees. To
address this problem we always include country ﬁxed-eﬀects to try to control for any diﬀerences
across countries. Second, we control for size and industry. This should help to condition out
some of the factors that lead to under/over sampling of ﬁrms. Finally, we made sure the results
were robust to dropping Germany and Portugal.
45% of the ﬁrms we contacted took part in the survey: a high success rate given the
voluntary nature of participation. Of the remaining ﬁrms 17% refused to be surveyed, while
the remaining 38% were in the process of being scheduled when the survey ended. The decisions
to reject the interview is uncorrelated with revenues per worker, listing status of the ﬁrm or
ﬁrm age. Large ﬁrms and multinationals were more likely to respond although the magnitude
of this eﬀect is small (e.g. multinationals were about 7% more likely to agree to the interview
and ﬁrms about 4 percentage points more likely for a doubling in size).
C.2 Harte Hanks Data
The ICT data used is constructed using the Ci Technology Database (CiDB) produced by
the international marketing and information company Harte Hanks (HH). Harte-Hanks is a
NYSE listed multinational that collects IT data primarily for the purpose of selling on to
large producers and suppliers of IT products (e.g. IBM, Dell etc). Their data is collected for
over 160,000 plants across 20 European countries, and another 250,000 across the US. The US
branch has the longest history with the company beginning its data collection activities in the
mid 1980s.
Harte Hanks surveys plants (referred to as “sites” in the CiTB database) on a rolling basis
with an average of 11 months between surveys. This means that at any given time, the data
provides a “snapshot” of the stock of a ﬁrm’s IT. The CiTDB contains detailed hardware,
equipment and software information at the plant level. Areas covered by the survey include
PCs, many types of software, servers, storage and IT staﬀ (including development staﬀ such as
programmers). The fact that HH sells this data on to major ﬁrms like IBM and Cisco, who use
this to target their sales eﬀorts, exerts a strong market discipline on the data quality. If there
were major discrepancies in the collected data this would rapidly be picked up by HH’s clients
when they placed sales calls using the survey data, and would obviously be a severe problem
for HH future sales.40 Because of this HH run extensive internal random quality checks on its
own data, enabling them to ensure high levels of data accuracy.
Another valuable feature of the CiDB is its consistency of collection across countries. The
data for Europe is collected via a central call centre in Dublin and this ensures that all vari-
39So, for the UK and France this sampling frame was very similar to the 2006 sampling frame. For Germany
it is more heavily skewed towards publicly quoted ﬁrms since smaller privately held ﬁrms do not report balance
sheet information. For the US it comprised only publicly quoted ﬁrms. As a result when we present results we
always include controls for ﬁrm size.
40HH also refunds data-purchases for any samples with error levels above 5%.
41ables are deﬁned on an identical basis across countries. This provides some advantages over
alternative strategies such as (for example) harmonizing government statistical register data
collected by independent national agencies.
HH samples all ﬁrms with over 100 employees in each country. Thus, we do lose smaller
ﬁrms, but since we focus on manufacturing the majority of employees are in these larger ﬁrms.
It is also worth noting this survey frame is based on ﬁrm employment - rather than plant
employment - so the data contains plants with less than 100 employees in ﬁrms with multiple
plants. Furthermore, HH only drops plants from the survey if they die or repeatedly refuse
to answer over several years, so that the sampling frame covers all ﬁrms that have had at 100
employees in any year since the survey began. In terms of survey response rate HH reports
that for the large European countries (UK, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain) they had a
response rate of 37.2% in 2004 for ﬁrms with 100 or more employees. Bloom, Draca and Van
Reenen (2010) provide further information on the HH dataset.
C.3 Firm level accounting data
Our ﬁrm accounting data on sales, employment, capital, proﬁts, shareholder equity, long-term
debt, market values (for quoted ﬁrms) and wages (where available) came from Amadeus dataset
for Europe (France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Sweden and the U.K.) and on Icarus
for the US
C.4 Leased Line Data
The data on cross national prices is given by OECD (2007). Although European prices have
been falling over the past decade due to liberalizations and pressures from the regulators (e.g.
European Commission DG-Competition), there remains considerable concern about diﬀerential
degrees of competition and regulation generating cross-national price disparities. “Local leased
line prices remain of concern where there is insuﬃcient competition. For users in these areas this
means that incumbents can continue to charge prices that are not disciplined by competition.
For new entrants it means that incumbents may price local leased circuits in an anti-competitive
manner” (OECD Communication Outlook, 2005).
“Leased lines are provided by traditional telecom operators. New market entrants have
their own networks but need to link their customers’ premises to it. This link is called a
‘leased line part circuit’ and is usually provided by the incumbent. The availability at the
wholesale level of these links at reasonable prices is a necessary condition for a competitive
leased lines retail market and for pro-competitive downstream ‘knock-on’ eﬀects” (European
Commission Report, 2002)
A major turning point in the pricing of leased lines took place in 1998 when a signiﬁcant
number of European countries fully liberalized their telecommunication markets. The impact
of increasing liberalization is evident in the OECD’s Index of leased line prices. At the distances
of 50 and 200 kilometers the leased lines (2Mbit/s) index fell from 77 in 1997 to 31 by 2004.





TABLE 1 – SUMMARY OF MAIN THEORETICAL PREDICTIONS THAT WE EMPIRICALLY TEST 
 
              
    (1)  (2)  (3) 
   
Plant Manager 
Autonomy 
Worker Autonomy  Plant Manager Span 
of Control 
      (Table 3)  (Table 4)  (Table 5) 
         
Reduction in Communication costs (h) 
Technology Indicator  NETWORK (h)  NETWORK (h)  NETWORK (h) 
Theoretical Prediction  -  -  ? 
Empirical Finding  -  -  +  
 
       
Reduction in Information acquisition costs (a) 
Technology Indicator  ERP (am)  CAD/CAM (ap)  CAD/CAM (ap) 
Theoretical Prediction  +  +  + 
Empirical Finding  +  +  + 
 
Notes: This table presents the theoretical predictions and the empirical findings. Column (1) refers to plant manager autonomy; Column (2) refers to workers’ autonomy; and 
Column (3) refers to span of control (for plant manager and CEO). NETWORK denotes the presence of a network (leased line/frame relay); ERP denotes the presence of 
Enterprise Resource Planning and CAD/CAM denotes the presence of Computer Assisted Design/Computer Assisted Manufacturing. A “+” denotes an increase, a “-’’ a 
decrease a “0” denotes no effect and “?’’ denotes an ambiguous sign. All empirical findings except for reduction in communication costs in Column (2) and (3) are 







TABLE 2 - SUMMARY STATISTICS  
 
Variable  Mean  Median 
Standard 
Deviation  Firms 
Employment (Firm)  961.701  350  3255.548  945 
Employment (Plant)  249.521  153  276.077  912 
Plant Manager Autonomy  0.255  0  0.982  950 
Workers' Autonomy  0.076  0  0.265  937 
Ln(Plant Manager SPAN)   1.891  2  0.523  875 
CEO Span (Multi-plant dummy)  0.640  1  0.480  950 
Computers per Employee  0.496  0  0.358  937 
ERP  0.340  0  0.390  950 
CAD/CAM  0.030  0  0.154  614 
NETWORK  0.358  0  0.396  950 
LAN/WAN  0.475  0  0.456  930 
Foreign Multinational  0.349  0  0.477  950 
Domestic Multinational  0.286  0  0.452  950 
%College  15.882  10  17.041  870 
Bonus as a % of salary  0.112  0  0.151  863 
% Increase salary on promotion  0.214  0  0.189  611 
Leased Line Price (PPP 2006 USD)  4985.139  5260  1437.936  950 
Ln(Distance from Walldorf)  6.862  7  1.150  950 
 
Notes: These are descriptive statistics from the sample in Table 3 (except for CAD/CAM which is Table 4). The mean of 




TABLE 3 - PLANT MANAGER AUTONOMY 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Dependent Variable  Plant Manager Autonomy 
             
ERP  0.150*  0.169*      0.181**  0.192** 
  (0.085)  (0.087)      (0.085)  (0.087) 
NETWORK      -0.177**  -0.163*  -0.208**  -0.188** 
      (0.090)  (0.090)  (0.091)  (0.090) 
Ln(Percentage College)    0.107***    0.104***    0.104*** 
    (0.033)    (0.033)    (0.033) 
ln(Computers/Employee)    -0.059    -0.025    -0.043 
    (0.045)    (0.045)    (0.045) 
ln(Firm Employment)  0.069*  0.058  0.076*  0.068  0.075*  0.065 
  (0.042)  (0.043)  (0.041)  (0.043)  (0.041)  (0.043) 
Plant Employment  0.133***  0.126***  0.133***  0.132***  0.129***  0.125*** 
  (0.047)  (0.048)  (0.047)  (0.048)  (0.047)  (0.048) 
Foreign Multinational  0.151*  0.160*  0.193**  0.190**  0.182**  0.184** 
  (0.082)  (0.083)  (0.082)  (0.083)  (0.083)  (0.084) 
Domestic Multinational  0.146*  0.141  0.170**  0.157*  0.165*  0.156* 
  (0.086)  (0.087)  (0.087)  (0.088)  (0.086)  (0.087) 
Number of Observations  1,000  1,000  1,000  1,000  1,000  1,000 
Number of Firms  950  950  950  950  950  950 
 
Notes: * = significant at the 10% level, **= significant at the 5% level, ***=significant at the 1% level. The dependent variable 
is the z-score of plant manager autonomy (mean=0 and standard deviation=1) across four questions relating to plant manager’s 
control  over  hiring,  investment,  product  introduction  and  marketing  (see  text).  All  columns  are  estimated  by  OLS  with 
standard errors in parentheses (robust and clustered by firm). The sample includes firms based in France, Germany, Italy, 
Portugal, Poland, Sweden, the UK and the US (country dummies included). All columns include a full set  of three digit 
industry dummies, “Noise controls” (analyst fixed effects, plant manager seniority and tenure in company, the day of the week 
the interview was conducted, interview duration and reliability) and a variable summarizing the number of Harte Hanks cross 
sections  over  which  the  technology  variables  have  been  computed.  “ERP”  denotes  Enterprise  Resource  Planning  and 
“NETWORK” denotes the firm has an internal network (leased lines or frame relays). All columns exclude firms where the 
plant manager is the CEO and include a dummy equal to unity if the CEO is on site. There are more observations than number 




TABLE 4 – WORKERS’ AUTONOMY 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Dependent Variable  Workers’ Autonomy 
             
CAD/CAM  0.930**  0.893**      0.947**  0.915** 
  (0.420)  (0.418)      (0.414)  (0.411) 
  [0.116]  [0.104]      [0.117]  [0.104] 
NETWORK      -0.269  -0.352  -0.285  -0.367 
      (0.214)  (0.224)  (0.216)  (0.225) 
      [-0.034]  [-0.041]  [-0.035]  [-0.042] 
Ln(Percentage College)    0.290***    0.295***    0.289*** 
    (0.095)    (0.094)    (0.095) 
    [0.034]    [0.034]    [0.033] 
ln(Computers /Employee)    0.138    0.176    0.181 
    (0.123)    (0.125)    (0.126) 
    [0.016]    [0.020]    [0.021] 
ln(Firm Employment)  0.035  0.032  0.053  0.053  0.041  0.043 
  (0.096)  (0.096)  (0.095)  (0.096)  (0.096)  (0.096) 
  [0.004]  [0.004]  [0.007]  [0.006]  [0.005]  [0.005] 
Plant Employment  -0.043  -0.026  -0.027  -0.007  -0.047  -0.023 
  (0.122)  (0.127)  (0.123)  (0.127)  (0.123)  (0.127) 
  [-0.005]  [-0.003]  [-0.003]  [-0.001]  [-0.006]  [-0.003] 
Foreign Multinational  0.385*  0.317  0.431**  0.361  0.407*  0.337 
  (0.204)  (0.217)  (0.209)  (0.221)  (0.209)  (0.221) 
  [0.052]  [0.039]  [0.060]  [0.045]  [0.055]  [0.041] 
Domestic Multinational  0.206  0.179  0.252  0.229  0.230  0.211 
  (0.204)  (0.211)  (0.205)  (0.214)  (0.205)  (0.213) 
  [0.027]  [0.022]  [0.034]  [0.028]  [0.030]  [0.026] 
Number of Observations  649  649  649  649  649  649 
Number of Firms  614  614  614  614  614  614 
Notes: * = significant at the 10% level, **= significant at the 5% level, ***=significant at the 1% level. The dependent variable 
in all columns is a dummy equal to unity if the plant manager reports that tasks allocation and pace of work are determined 
mostly by workers (instead of managers). All columns are estimated by probit ML with standard errors in parentheses (robust 
and clustered by firm). Marginal effects (evaluated at the mean) reported in square brackets. All columns exclude firms where 
the plant manager is the CEO and include a dummy equal to unity if the CEO is on site. The sample includes firms based in 
France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Poland, Sweden, the UK and the US (country dummies included). A full set of three digit 
industry dummies, “Noise controls” (analyst fixed effects, plant manager seniority and tenure in company, the day of the week 
the interview was conducted, interview duration and reliability) and a variable summarizing the number of Harte Hanks cross 
sections  over  which  the  technology  variables  have  been  computed.  “CAD/CAM”  denotes  Computer  Assisted  Design/ 
Computer Assisted Manufacturing and “NETWORK” denotes the firm has an internal network (leased lines or frame relays). 






TABLE 5 - PLANT MANAGER SPAN OF CONTROL 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Dependent Variable  Plant Manager Span of Control 
             
CAD/CAM  0.253**  0.244**      0.253**  0.244** 
  (0.117)  (0.120)      (0.117)  (0.120) 
NETWORK      -0.012  -0.016  -0.013  -0.016 
      (0.057)  (0.058)  (0.056)  (0.058) 
Ln(Percentage College)    0.042*    0.044*    0.042* 
    (0.023)    (0.023)    (0.023) 
ln(Computers /Employee)    0.004    0.006    0.006 
    (0.030)    (0.030)    (0.030) 
ln(Firm Employment)  0.062**  0.059**  0.066**  0.063**  0.062**  0.060** 
  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.027)  (0.026)  (0.027) 
Plant Employment  0.048  0.052  0.052  0.056*  0.047  0.052 
  (0.033)  (0.033)  (0.033)  (0.033)  (0.033)  (0.033) 
Foreign Multinational  0.034  0.025  0.032  0.023  0.036  0.027 
  (0.055)  (0.056)  (0.056)  (0.057)  (0.056)  (0.057) 
Domestic Multinational  0.071  0.066  0.067  0.062  0.072  0.067 
  (0.057)  (0.057)  (0.057)  (0.057)  (0.057)  (0.057) 
Number of Observations  902  902  902  902  902  902 
Number of Firms  859  859  859  859  859  859 
 
Notes: * = significant at the 10% level, **= significant at the 5% level, ***=significant at the 1% level. The dependent variable 
in all columns is the log of the number of employees reporting directly to the plant manager. All columns are estimated by 
OLS with standard errors in parentheses (robust and clustered by firm). All columns exclude firms where the plant manager is 
the CEO and include a dummy equal to unity if the CEO is on site. The sample includes firms based in France, Germany, Italy, 
Portugal, Poland, Sweden, the UK and the US (country dummies included). All columns include a full set of three digit 
industry dummies, “Noise controls” (analyst fixed effects, plant manager seniority and tenure in company, the day of the week 
the interview was conducted, interview duration and reliability) and a variable summarizing the number of Harte Hanks cross 
sections  over  which  the  technology  variables  have  been  computed.  “CAD/CAM”  denotes  Computer  Assisted  Design  or 
Manufacturing software and “NETWORK” denotes the firm has an internal network (leased lines or frame relays). There are 





TABLE 6 – PLANT MANAGER AUTONOMY, INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE ESTIMATES 
 






















Regression  1st Stage  Reduced 
Form  2nd Stage  1st Stage  Reduced 
Form 
2nd 
Stage  2nd Stage 
               
ERP      1.876**        1.540* 
      (0.780)        (0.799) 
NETWORK            -2.771*  -3.198 
            (1.517)  (2.248) 
Ln(Distance   -0.237**  -0.445*           
to Walldorf)  (0.104)  (0.242)           
Ln(NETWORK Price) 
*(Industry NETWORK         -1.439*  3.988**     
Intensity)        (0.779)  (1.928)     
               
Number of observations  165  165  165  956  956  956  165 
Number of firms  161  161  161  908  908  908  161 
 
Notes: * = significant at the 10% level, **= significant at the 5% level, ***=significant at the 1% level. The dependent variable is the z-score of plant manager autonomy. 
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the regional level in all columns (54 regions). All columns exclude firms where the plant manager is the CEO and include a 
dummy equal to unity if the CEO is on site. The sample includes firms based in France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Poland and Sweden (country dummies included). All 
multinational subsidiaries are dropped in columns 1-3 and 7. All columns include noise controls, firm controls and industry dummies as in previous tables. The instrument for 
ERP is the distance (in km) from Walldorf, Heidelberg (the head quarters and founding place of SAP). The instrument for Networks is the cost of communications interacted 
with industry-level network intensity. “Industry NETWORK INTENSITY” represents the fraction of workers with access to an internal network (leased lines or frame relays) 
in the three-digit industry across all countries. “NETWORK Price” is the cost of an annual subscription to a leased line contract at 2006 PPP USD (taken from the OECD 
Telecommunication Handbook, 2007). Regressions weighted by the plant's share of firm employment. There are more observations than number of firms because some firms 
were interviewed more than once across different plants. 
  
 
TABLE 7 - ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 



















at least 3 firms  
Panel A: Plant Manager Autonomy                 
ERP  0.192**  0.181**  0.189**  0.179**  0.193**  0.206**  0.221**  0.194** 
  (0.087)  (0.092)  (0.088)  (0.086)  (0.087)  (0.095)  (0.094)  (0.088) 
NETWORK  -0.188**  -0.228**  -0.179*  -0.144*  -0.189**  -0.188**  -0.202**  -0.213** 
  (0.090)  (0.095)  (0.092)  (0.084)  (0.090)  (0.096)  (0.096)  (0.092) 
Observations  1,000  1,000  1,000  1,000  1,000  1,000  1,000  920 
Firms  950  950  950  950  950  950  950  872 
Panel B: Workers' Autonomy                 
CAD/CAM  0.915**  1.373***  0.862**  0.897**  0.822*  0.704*  0.917**  0.876** 
  (0.411)  (0.503)  (0.409)  (0.425)  (0.429)  (0.373)  (0.415)  (0.398) 
  [0.104]  [0.095]  [0.086]  [0.099]  [0.092]  [0.115]  [0.104]  [0.115] 
NETWORK  -0.367  -0.500*  -0.428*  -0.011*  -0.404*  -0.409**  -0.358  -0.431* 
  (0.225)  (0.282)  (0.235)  (0.006)  (0.230)  (0.193)  (0.226)  (0.228) 
  [-0.042]  [-0.035]  [-0.043]  [-0.001]  [-0.045]  [-0.067]  [-0.041]  [-0.057] 
Observations  649  547  646  649  649  840  649  608 
Firms  614  512  611  614  614  796  614  574 
Panel C: Plant Manager Span of Control                 
CAD/CAM  0.246**  0.340***  0.263**  0.246**  0.246**    0.261**  0.255** 
  (0.119)  (0.120)  (0.122)  (0.119)  (0.119)    (0.115)  (0.121) 
NETWORK  -0.021  -0.010  -0.036  0.001  -0.021    -0.004  -0.035 
  (0.058)  (0.062)  (0.059)  (0.002)  (0.058)    (0.058)  (0.058) 
Observations  902  902  902  902  902    902  822 
Firms  859  859  859  859  859    859  781 
Notes: * = significant at the 10%, ** = 5%, ***= 1%. Panel A and C estimated by OLS. Panel B is estimated by probit with standard errors in parentheses and marginal effects (evaluated 
at the mean) in square brackets. Standard errors are clustered by firm in all columns. sample includes firms based in France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Poland, Sweden, the UK and the US 
(country dummies included). All columns exclude firms where the plant manager is the CEO and include a dummy equal to unity if the CEO is on site. All columns include noise controls, 
firm controls and industry dummies as in previous tables.  “ERP” = Enterprise Resource Planning, “NETWORK” = firm has an internal network (leased lines or frame relays) and 
“CAD/CAM” = Computer Assisted Design or Manufacturing. In column (2) regional (NUTS2) dummies and the inverse of the Lerner index are included as additional controls. In column 
(3) the ln(capital/employment ratio), ln(sales/employment ratio), ln(average wages), ln(global ultimate owner employment), ln(firm age) and a publicly listed dummy are included as 
additional controls. In column (4) the network variable denotes the presence of LAN/WAN systems. In column (5) we construct the ICT variables as equal to unity if there is a positive 
value in any plant. In column (5) the average management score (computed across the 18 management questions in Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007) is included as additional control. In 
column (6) the dependent variable is the principal factor component of the four different Plant Manager Autonomy questions (Panel A) and a dummy equal to unity if the pace of work 
question takes values above three (Panel B).  In column (7) we drop firm and plant size from the regressions. Column (8) conditions on having at least three firms per three digit industry. 





TABLE A1 - ERP SURVEY: THE IMPACT OF ERP IS MORE ON INFORMATION COSTS THAN ON COMMUNICATION COSTS 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dependent Variable  DIF1  DIF1  DIF2  DIF3 
         
Constant  1.074***  1.068**  1.042**  0.102 
  (0.060)  (0.512)  (0.496)  (0.383) 
         
Firms  431  431  431  431 
         
Country controls  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry controls  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Employment controls  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
Notes: Countries are Germany and Poland (Kretschmer and Mahr, 2009). Estimation by OLS. Robust standard errors below coefficients. Industry controls are 
three digit employment. Questions are on a 1 to 7 Lickert Scale from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). 
 
Q21  “Our ERP system is used to endow top management with more and better information” 
Q24  “Our ERP system is used to endow (middle) managers with more and better information” 
Q23  “Our ERP system is used to faster communicate information and directives from top management to employees” 
Q26  “Our ERP system is used to faster communicate information and directives from (middle) management to employees” 
 
Definitions of dependent variable: 
DIF1 = Q24 – Q23 
DIF2 = Q24 – Q26 
DIF3 = Q24 - Q21 
 
So DIF1, for example is the absolute difference between “ERP endows middle management with better information” less “ERP is used to faster communicate 
information and directives from top management to employees”. This is an index from -4 to 4 indicating the degree to which ERP reduces information costs 
relative to communication costs. A positive value of this index indicates that managers are more likely to view ERP as improving information costs rather 
than reducing communication costs.  
 
TABLE A2: DETAILS OF THE DECENTRALIZATION SURVEY QUESTIONS 
 
For Questions D1, D3 and D4 any score can be given, but the scoring guide is only provided for scores of 1, 3 and 5. 
Question D1: “To hire a FULL-TIME PERMANENT SHOPFLOOR worker what agreement would your plant need from CHQ (Central Head Quarters)?” 
Probe until you can accurately score the question – for example if they say “It is my decision, but I need sign-off from corporate HQ.” ask “How often would sign-off be given?” 
    Score 1  Score 3  Score 5 
  Scoring grid:  No authority – even for replacement hires  Requires sign-off from CHQ based on the 
business case. Typically agreed (i.e. about 
80% or 90% of the time). 
Complete authority – it is my decision entirely 
 
Question D2: “What is the largest CAPITAL INVESTMENT your plant could make without prior authorization from CHQ?” 
Notes: (a) Ignore form-filling 
            (b) Please cross check any zero response by asking “What about buying a new computer – would that be possible?”, and then probe…. 
            (c) Challenge any very large numbers (e.g. >$¼m in US) by asking “To confirm your plant could spend $X on a new piece of equipment without prior clearance from CHQ?” 
            (d) Use the national currency and do not omit zeros (i.e. for a US firm twenty thousand dollars would be 20000). 
Question D3: “Where are decisions taken on new product introductions – at the plant, at the CHQ or both”? 
Probe until you can accurately score the question – for example if they say “It is complex, we both play a role “ask “Could you talk me through the process for a recent product 
innovation?” 
    Score 1  Score 3  Score 5 
  Scoring grid:  All new product introduction decisions are 
taken at the CHQ 
 
New product introductions are jointly 
determined by the plant and CHQ 
All new product introduction decisions taken at the plant 
level 
Question D4: “How much of sales and marketing is carried out at the plant level (rather than at the CHQ)”? 
Probe until you can accurately score the question. Also take an average score for sales and marketing if they are taken at different levels. 
    Score 1  Score 3  Score 5 
  Scoring grid:  None – sales and marketing is all run by 
CHQ 
Sales and marketing decisions are split 
between the plant and CHQ 
 
The plant runs all sales and marketing 
Question D5: “Is the CHQ on the site being interviewed”? 
 
Question D6: “How much do managers decide how tasks are allocated across workers in their teams” 
Interviewers are read out the following five options, with 
our scoring for these note above: 
Score 1  Score 2  Score 3  Score 4  Score 5 
All  managers  Mostly managers  About equal  Mostly workers  All workers 
Question D7: “Who decides the pace of work on the shopfloor” 
Interviewers are read out the following five options, with 
“customer demand”  an additional not read-out option 
Score 1  Score 2  Score 3  Score 4  Score 5 
All  managers  Mostly managers  About equal  Mostly workers  All workers 
Question D8: “How many people directly report to the PLANT MANAGER (i.e. the number of people the PLANT MANAGER manages directly in the hierarchy below 
him)? Note: cross-check answers of X above 20 by asking “So you directly manage on a daily basis X people?” 
 




TABLE A3 – EXTENDED THEORY PREDICTIONS  
                 
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 






Span of Control 
(sm) 
CEO  Span of 
Control (sc) 
           
Reduction in communication costs (h)  Technology Indicator  NETWORK (h)  NETWORK (h)  NETWORK (h)  NETWORK (h) 
Theoretical Prediction  -  -  ?  ? 
              
Reduction in information acquisition 
costs for non-production decisions (am) 
Technology Indicator  ERP (am)  ERP (am)  ERP (am)  ERP (am) 
Theoretical Prediction  +  -  -  + 
                 
Reduction in information acquisition 
costs for production decisions (ap) 
Technology Indicator  CAD/CAM (ap)  CAD/CAM (ap)  CAD/CAM (ap)  CAD/CAM (ap) 
Theoretical Prediction  0  +  +  0 
              
 
Notes: ERP denotes Enterprise Resource Planning, CAD/CAM denotes Computer Assisted Design/Computer Assisted Manufacturing and NETWORK denotes the presence of 
a network (leased line/frame relay). A “+” denotes an increase, a “-’’ a decrease a “0” denotes no effect and “?’’ denotes an ambiguous sign.  
 
 
TABLE A4 – CROSS EFFECTS OF TECHNOLOGIES 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 





       
ERP  0.193**  0.033  0.045 
  (0.087)  (0.224)  (0.058) 
    [0.003]   
CAD/CAM  0.219  0.950**  0.245** 
  (0.221)  (0.420)  (0.119) 
    [0.100]   
NETWORK  -0.189**  -0.402*  -0.019 
  (0.090)  (0.227)  (0.059) 
    [-0.042]   
Number of Observations  1,000  649  902 
Number of Firms  950  614  859 
 
Notes: * = significant at the 10% level, **= significant at the 5% level, ***=significant at the 1% level. Rows correspond 
to separate regressions based on final most general specifications in Tables 3 - 5. All equations estimated by OLS except 
Worker autonomy equation which is estimated by probit ML with marginal effects (evaluated at the mean) in square 
brackets. Standard errors are robust and clustered by firm. The sample includes firms based in France, Germany, Italy, 
Portugal, Poland, Sweden, the UK and the US (country dummies included). ERP” denotes Enterprise Resource Planning, 
“NETWORK” denotes the firm has an internal network (leased lines or frame relays) and “CAD/CAM” denotes Computer 







TABLE A5 – CEO SPAN OF CONTROL  
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Dependent Variable  CEO Span of Control 
       
ERP    0.378***  0.347*** 
    (0.130)  (0.132) 
    [0.133]  [0.122] 
NETWORK  0.412***    0.383*** 
  (0.142)    (0.143) 
  [0.145]    [0.134] 
Ln(Percentage College)  0.101*  0.097*  0.102* 
  (0.053)  (0.053)  (0.053) 
  [0.036]  [0.034]  [0.036] 
ln(COMPUTERS/Employee)  -0.082  -0.079  -0.108 
  (0.076)  (0.076)  (0.076) 
  [-0.029]  [-0.028]  [-0.038] 
ln(Firm Employment)  0.248***  0.267***  0.250*** 
  (0.070)  (0.070)  (0.071) 
  [0.087]  [0.094]  [0.088] 
Plant Employment  -0.504***  -0.513***  -0.516*** 
  (0.097)  (0.096)  (0.096) 
  [-0.177]  [-0.180]  [-0.181] 
Number of Observations  1,116  1,116  1,116 
Number of Firms  1,061  1,061  1,061 
 
Notes: * = significant at the 10% level, **= significant at the 5% level, ***=significant at the 1% level. The dependent 
variable in all columns is a dummy equal to one if the firm reports more than one production plant. All columns are 
estimated by probit ML with standard errors in parentheses (robust and clustered by firm). Marginal effects (evaluated at 
the mean) reported in square brackets. The sample includes firms based in France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Poland, 
Sweden, the UK and the US (country dummies included). All columns contain the same controls in Table 3-5 “ERP” 
denotes Enterprise Resource Planning and “NETWORK” denotes the firm has an internal network system (leased lines or 
frame relays).   
 
 
TABLE A6 - CONTROLLING FOR CONTINGENT PAY 
 


















             
ERP  0.193**      0.189**     
  (0.087)      (0.087)     
             
CAD/CAM    0.908**  0.239**    0.982**  0.247** 
    (0.402)  (0.119)    (0.413)  (0.115) 
    [0.101]      [0.104]   
NETWORK  -0.187**  -0.382*  -0.017  -0.186**  -0.329  -0.018 
  (0.090)  (0.227)  (0.058)  (0.091)  (0.228)  (0.058) 
    [-0.042]      [-0.035]   
Bonus as a % of Total Salary  0.385  -1.121  0.152       
For typical manager  (0.249)  (0.756)  (0.144)       
    [-0.124]         
% Salary Increase on Promotion        -0.060  0.303  0.175 
For a typical manager        (0.221)  (0.479)  (0.128) 
          [0.032]   
             
Number of Observations  1,000  649  902  1,000  649  902 
Number of Firms  950  614  859  950  614  859 
 
Notes: * = significant at the 10% level, **= significant at the 5% level, ***=significant at the 1% level. All columns 
estimated by OLS except columns 2 and 5 which are estimated by probit ML with standard errors in parentheses and 
marginal effects (evaluated at the mean) in square brackets. Standard errors are robust and clustered by firm in all columns. 
The sample includes firms based in France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Poland, Sweden, the UK and the US (country 
dummies included). All columns include the same controls as Table 3 through 5. “ERP” denotes Enterprise Resource 
Planning, “NETWORK” denotes the firm has an internal network (leased lines or frame relays) and “CAD/CAM” denotes 
Computer Assisted Design or Manufacturing software. Figure 1: Delegation of tasks in the Basic Model
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] , 0 [ 0 z z
] 1 (
Notes: Performed by lower level agents
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Notes: This generalizes Figure 1 where we allow for non-production decisions 
and production decisions. Non-production decisions below xmare performed by 
plant managers, the rest by central head quarters. Production decisions below 
z0 are performed by production workers, the rest by plant managersCHQ
Figure 4: Information and communication
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CAD/CAMFigure A1: Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) use
Q2: “Our ERP System is used to faster 
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middle management with more & better 
information” 
Q4: “Our ERP System is used to faster 
communicate information and directives from 
middle management to employees”
Notes: Answers range from 1=“strongly disagree” to 5=“strongly agree”. Each bar represents the % 
of respondents in the relevant bin from 431 firms. See Appendix B for details.CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
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